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1980 Supreme(SC) 6

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.N. SHINGHAL AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.
Meharban Singh, Appellant
Versus
Bhagwant Singh, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 2113 of 1972
Decided on 17-11-1980.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Shiv Dayal, Sr. Advocate (Mr. J. S. Sinha, Advocate with him for Appellant; Mr. M. C. Bhandare, Sr. Advocate (Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Mrs. Shobha Dixit, Advocates with him), for Respondents; Mr. S. K. Gambhir, Advocate, for the State.
* Second Appeal No. 310 of 1960, D/- 10-2-1972 (Madh Pra).

Advocates:
J.S.SINHA, M.C.BHANDARE, S.K.Gambhir, SHIV DAYAL SHRIVASTAVA, SHOBHA DIXIT, URMILA KAPUR

Headnote:Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (MP)-Ss. 3, 4 (1) (f) and 4 (2) - position of mortgadgee and mortgagor of proprietary rig/Its-benefit of retaining khud-kasht - possession over mortgaged lands by mortgagee or tenants inducted by mortgagee is deemed to be of the mortgagor.

       The mortgadgee of the Zamindari lands lost possession of the lands which were once mortgaged with him with possession, and was left only with the normal right of a simple mortgagee to realise the mortgadgee money.

       (Para 5)

       The fate of the mortgagor, who was once a proprietor was even worse, because he lost proprietary rights in the land because of vesting under section 3, and had none-the less to fulfil the obligation as a mortgagor to the extent of the amount secured under the mortgage.

       (Para 6)

       The legislature therefore thought of alleviating the lot of those of such proprietors whose cases fell under sub-section (2) of section 4.

       (Para 6)

       Those proprietors were permitted to remain in possession of their lands who had khud-kasht lands and the lands were recorded as khud-kasht in the annual village papers before the date of vesting.

       (Para 7)

       If at the date of vesting the actual possession in case of mortgadgee with possession, clause (f) of sub-section (l) of section 4 gave the mortgagor the benefit of sub-section (2) of that section to claim the right to remain in possession of his khud-kasht land which was in his possession upto the date of the mortgage. If the requirement of sub-section (2) is fulfilled the expropriator cannot be denied the benefit.

       (Para 11)

       Even if the mortgadgee inducts tenants during the mortgadgee, the rights of the proprietor are not affected the tenancy terminates according to ordinary law of redemption unless they could claim protection under any other law. There is no such protection in the present case.

       (Para 12)

JUDGMENT

SHINGHAL, J. :—This appeal of one of the plaintiffs, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated Feb. 10, 1972 by which the suit for possession of the lands, which the plaintiffs had mortgaged, has been dismissed even though the trial courts decree for redemption has been mentioned. As the matter has come up to this Court for the second time, at the instance of the plaintiffs, it is not necessary to state all the facts for they have been mentioned in this Courts earlier decision in Meharbansingh v. Nareshsingh (1970) 3 SCR 18. It will be sufficient to refer to those facts which bear on the present controversy.

2. The suit lands belonged to Samle Singh, father of appellant Meharban Singh, and Jomdar Singh who executed a registered deed of mortgage in favour of Munshi Singh on May 20, 1939, for Rs. 2242/14/-. It is not disputed before us that it was a usufructuary mortgage of lands within the area of the former Gwalior State. The mortgagors gave a notice to the mortgagee on May 15, 1943, for redemption of the lands but he refused to accept it. The mortgagors filed the suit for redemption on June 15, 1943. As some other persons were alleged to be in possession of the suit lands they were also impleaded as defendants. The Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (Samvat 2008), hereinafter referred to as the Act, came into force on October 2, 1951, and leave was granted to the plaintiffs to amend the plaint suitably. The trial court decreed the suit on October 10, 1958, but disallowed the relief for the grant of mesne profits. Three appeals were preferred against that judgment and decree of the trial court. The appellate court dismissed the appeals of the defendants. It held that the suit lands were the khud-kasht lands of the mortgagors, and allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs for mesne profits from the date of the deposit of the mortgage-money. The defendants went in second appeal to the High Court; and the plaintiffs also preferred an appeal for refusal of mesne profits from the date of the cause of action. The High Court partly allowed the defendants appeal by its judgment dated September 27, 1962. It relied on this Court decision in Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao (1962) Supp1 SCR 123 and held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to possession. It dismissed the appeal of plaintiff Meharbansingh. He applied to this Court for special leave, and that led to this Courts decision in Meharbansinghs case mentioned above. This court allowed the appeal and, after considering the relevant provisions of the Act, remitted the case to the High Court for fresh decisions after notice to the State on the point whether the suit lands were khud-kasht of the plaintiffs and they were entitled to remain in possession under Section 4 of the Act. The State was therefore allowed to be impleaded as a party and to file a written statement. Certain additional issues were framed by the High Court and the case was remitted to the trial court for its findings. When it came to the High Court again, with those findings, it once again took the view that the plaintiffs were not entitled to possession of the suit lands although they were entitled to a decree for redemption. It is against that judgment of the High Court dated February 10, 1972, that plaintiff Meharbansingh has come up to this Court by way of the present appeal.

3. The facts of this case are thus quite simple, and its fate depends upon the answer to the question whether the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the suit lands under sub-section (2) Section 4 of the Act.

4. The Act made provision for abolition and acquisition of the rights of proprietors in villages, "muhals", "chaks" or blocks settled on the zamindari system. If therefore a person was a "proprietor" within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 2, all his proprietary rights vested in the State free of all encumbrances by virtue of sub-section (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act from the
































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