JUDGMENT

FAZAL ALI, J. :—This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated November 3, 1970 of the Bombay High Court dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant against a decision of a single Judge allowing a writ petition filed by the first respondent.

2. The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and may be briefly summarised as follows :

The appellant was a private company which was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial marbles and tiles and other accessories at village Majas Mogra, Jogeshwari, East Bombay. The company was spread over about 10 acres of land. Sometime in 1957 or 1958 the company moved the Government for acquiring additional land for purposes of the company. Accordingly, on the 7th January 1958, the Government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which was followed by a separate notice by the Land Acquisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed by another notification under Section 6 of the Act which was served on the respondent on the 25th January 1960. In pursuance of these notifications the acquisition proceedings went on which culminated in an award made under Section 12 of the Act on April 11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On December 11, 1961, a letter was written on behalf of the Government informing the owner of the acquired land that possession would be taken on or about the 12th of January 1962. The purpose of the acquisition, as mentioned in the notification, was public purposes for which the land is needed for Himalayan Tiles & Marble (Pvt.) Ltd. The first respondent in the writ petition filed in the High Court before a single Judge prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings should be quashed because the land was not acquired for any public purpose as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act. It was contended before the single Judge that the Government was not competent to acquire the land for purposes of a private company which could not be said to be a public purpose under Sec. 4 of the Act. The plea taken by the first respondent found favour with the single Judge who allowed the writ petition and quashed the land acquisition proceedings along with the notifications mentioned above.

3. Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which confirmed the view taken by the single Judge and dismissed the appeal mainly on the ground that the appellant had no locus stand to file the appeal before the Bench inasmuch as it was not a person interested within the meaning of Section 18 (1) of the Act.

4. In support of this appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant, Dr. Chitale, has argued two points before us. In the first place, it was submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court was wrong in holding that the appellant was not a person interested and therefore had no locus stand to file an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench. Secondly, it was argued that in view of the various amendments in the Act particularly in Ss. 40 and 41, it could not be said that the acquisition under Section 4 was ultra virtus of the Act. We might mention here that in the case of R.L. Arora v. State of U. P.,1962 Supp (2) SCR 149, majority of the judges of this court took the view that a mere acquisition for the benefit of a company was not a public purpose and therefore the notification made in that case was struck down. Sarkar, J., however, took a contrary view. In view of the decision parliament amended certain provisions of the Act particularly Sections 40, 41, 44A, 44B and added a new Section 5-A after Section 5. In other words, by virtue of the amendments, the basis of the decision of the SC in the first Arora case was removed. By virtue of Section 7 of the amending Act, retrospective effect was given to the amendment superseding any judgment, decree or order passed before July 20, 1962, Sectio