JUDGMENT

KRISHNA IYER. J. :— These petitions for special leave deserve to be dismissed because the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court which is challenged in all the three has been rightly decided in our view. Even so, a speaking order has become necessary because, as rightly pointed out by counsel, the earlier decision of this court in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 does not specifically cover the precise point that has been raised before us by counsel for the petitioner. We are concerned with the ambit and impact of S. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1978 (for short, the Act), which forbids a revision under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (acronymically, the C. P. C.) to the High Court from a judgment or order in appeal by the District Court where the suit out of which the case arises is not one of the value of Rs. 20,000 and above.

2. We have, in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 (supra) considered the scheme, setting and purpose of the U. P. Amendment to the Civil Procedure Code bearing on the revisory power of the High Court under S. 115, C. P. C. We may quote:

A schematic analysis of the judicial hierarchy within a State indicates that the High Court, as the apex court in the hierarchy, has been entrusted, not only with the supreme appellate power exercised within the State but also, by virtue of S. 115, the power to remove, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, any jurisdictional error committed by a subordinate court in those cases where the error cannot be corrected by resort to its appellate jurisdiction. The two salient features of revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 are, on the one hand, the closely limited grounds on which the court is permitted to interfere and on the other, the wide expanse of discretion available to the court, when it decides to interfere, in making an appropriate order. The intent is that so serious an error as one of jurisdiction, if committed by a subordinate court, should not remain uncorrected, and should be removed and record healed of the infirmity by an order shaped to reinstate the proceeding within the proper jurisdictional confines of the subordinate court.

xx xx xx

From its inception there was increasing resort to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 115. Over the years the volume of litigation reached an insupportable point in the pending docket of the Court. To alleviate the burden, a pattren of decentralisation of revisional power was adopted and S. 115 was amended by successive State amendments, each attempting to close the gap left by its predecessors.

Many times, amendments were made by the U. P. Legislature to effectuate its determined purpose of dichotomising and decentralising the revisional jurisdiction, a goal which is laudable and which other States may well regard as a paradigm.

3. The crucial provision, S. 3 of the Act, reads thus:

115. The High Court, in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before Aug. 1, 1973 and the District Court in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suit or other proceedings instituted before such date, may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court or District Court, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears-

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity;

the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be make such order in the case as it thinks fit:

Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to mak