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1980 Supreme(SC) 421

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. SARKARIA, O. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND A.P. SEN, JJ.
S.L. Kapoor, Appellant
Versus
Jagmohan and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 1516 of 1980, D/-18-9-1980.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee and Mr. V. M. Tarkunde and Mr. P. N. Lekhi, Sr. Advocates (M/s C. B. Singh, P. H. Parekh, Miss Manik Tarkunde, Rani Karanjwala, Hemant Sharma and Miss V. Caprihan, Advocates with them), for Appellant Mr. Lal Narain Sinha, Attorney General and R. N. Tandon, Sr. Advocate (Miss A. Subhashini, Advocate with them), for Respondents.

Advocates:
A.Subhashini, C.B.SINGH, HEMANT SHARMA, Manek Tarkunde, P.H.Parekh, P.N.LEKHI, R.N.Tandon, RANI KARANJAVALA, SOLI J.SORABJI, V.CAPRIHAN LAL, V.M.TARKUNDE

Headnote:Principles on natural justice knows no exclusive rule dependent on which it would have made any difference of natural justice has been observed - notice to allottee to show cause before the allotment order was going to be cancelled - prejudice.

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:

  1. The case involves a challenge to the order of supersession of a municipal committee, specifically concerning violations of the principles of natural justice, particularly the audi alteram partem rule, which requires that a person or body affected by a decision must be given an opportunity to be heard before the decision is made (!) (!) .

  2. The order of supersession was issued under a statutory provision that authorizes the government to supersede a committee if it is found to be incompetent, defaulting persistently, or exceeding or abusing its powers. However, the order failed to ensure that the committee was given adequate notice or opportunity to respond to the allegations prior to supersession (!) (!) .

  3. The order's validity was questioned because the municipal committee was not formally notified or given a chance to make representations regarding the specific grounds for supersession, which is essential when civil consequences, such as loss of office or rights, are involved (!) (!) .

  4. The court emphasized that even in cases of administrative action, if the action involves civil consequences or affects rights and responsibilities of a body or individual, natural justice principles, including the right to be heard, must be observed (!) (!) .

  5. The distinction between judicial and administrative acts has diminished, but natural justice still applies when the action has civil consequences. The requirement to observe natural justice is rooted in ensuring fairness and preventing arbitrary decisions (!) (!) .

  6. The procedural requirement of providing an opportunity to be heard is not negated by the existence of correspondence or preliminary discussions that are unrelated to the final decision or order (!) (!) .

  7. The failure to observe natural justice can be deemed prejudicial, regardless of whether the outcome would have been different if the affected party had been heard, because the core principle is fairness and the appearance of justice being done (!) (!) .

  8. Even if the facts before the authority are undisputed and only one legal conclusion or penalty is possible, the court may still intervene if the principles of natural justice have been violated, as non-observance undermines the legitimacy of the process (!) .

  9. The court clarified that the minimal natural justice requirement involves giving broad notice of allegations and an opportunity to respond, which must be proportionate to the nature of the proceedings and the potential consequences (!) (!) .

  10. The court held that the order of supersession was invalid due to the breach of natural justice principles, specifically because the municipal committee was not given proper notice or opportunity to respond to the allegations before the order was issued (!) .

  11. The court recognized that the remaining term of the committee was imminent, and therefore, it did not order reinstatement or quashing of the supersession notification. Instead, it declared the order invalid and emphasized that the procedural flaw alone was sufficient to invalidate the decision (!) .

  12. Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal, declared the supersession order invalid due to procedural unfairness, and awarded costs to the appellant. The court did not express an opinion on the merits of the supersession but focused solely on the procedural lapse (!) .

Please let me know if you need further elaboration or analysis on any specific aspect.


Judgment

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.:- In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 12 of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911, as applicable to New Delhi, the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi, by a notification dated September 29, 1979, appointed nine non-official members and four ex-officio members to the New Delhi Municipal Committee to hold office for a period of one year with effect from October 4, 1979. However, well before the expiry of the term for which the members were appointed, on February 27, 1980, the Lt. Governor, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 238 (1) superseded the New Delhi Municipal Committee with immediate effect and appointed Shri P. N. Behl as the person who may exercise and perform all powers and duties of the New Delhi Municipal Committee until the said Committee was reconstituted.

2. The preamble to the order of supersession recited that the Committee was incompetent to perform and had made persistent default in the performance of the duties imposed on it under the law and had further abused its powers, resulting in wastage of Municipal funds. Four instances or grounds were mentioned. The first ground was that a clause for the payment of a mobilisation advance of Rs. fifteen lakhs was included in the contract awarded to M/s. Tarspore & Co. for the construction of City Centre though such a clause did not find a place in the original contract with M/s. Mohinder Singh & Co. The contract we may mention here, had been awarded to M/s. Tarapore & Co. on the failure of M/s. Mohinder Singh & Co. to complete the work. It was alleged that the contract was awarded to Tarapore & Co., at an enhanced cost without the prior approval of the Lt. Governor. The inclusion of the clause relating to payment of mobilisation advance was also without the approval of the Lt. Governor. The second ground was that one B. K. Mittal was re-employed by the New Delhi Municipal Committee notwithstanding the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission that major penalty proceedings, should be initiated aganist him. The third ground was that although the Central Vigilance Commission advised the removal from service of V. P. Sangal, the Municipal Committee resolved to impose the minor penalty of stoppage of a few increments. The fourth ground was that the Municipal Committee created a number of posts including that of Director of Horticulture and appointed Shri Sharma to that post in spite of the directive of the Lt. Governor not to create posts unless the staffing pattern was studied by the Administrative Reforms Department.

3. Two of the non-official members of the superseded New Delhi Municipal Committee, Shri S. L. Kapoor and another, filed Civil Writ Petitions in the Delhi High Court to quash the order of supersession dated February 27, 1980. The Writ Petitions were heard by a Full Bench of five Judges and were dismissed on May 9, 1980. S. L. Kapoor has preferred this appeal after obtaining Special Leave of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.

4. Before the High Court, as before us, the principal submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant was that the order of supersession was passed in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and total disregard of fairplay. It was pointed out that no notice to show cause against supersession was ever issued to the Committee, there was not the slightest hint until the order was made that there was any proposal to supersede the Committee and the Committee never had any opportunity either before or after the order of supersession was passed to offer their explanation against the allegations made in the order of supersession. The Full Bench upheld the claim of the petitioners that it was necessary to hear the Committee before an order under Section 238 (1) of the Punjab Municipal Act was passed. But, held, the High Court, the Committee was made aware of the allegations and had been given opportunity to state its case or version in the case of at least
























































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