SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1981 Supreme(SC) 159

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND A.N. SEN, JJ.
Dev Raj Dogra and others, Appellants
Versus
Gyan Chand Jain and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 1653 of 1979, D/- 10-3-1981.
Advocates appeared
M/s. Madan Bhatia and Sushil Kumar, Advocates, for Appellants; Mr. S. N. Kacker, Sr. Advocate, M/s. S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri, E. M. S. Anam and M. K. Dua, Advocates, for Respondents.

Advocates:
E.M.S.ANAM, M.K.Dua, MADAN BHATIA, P.M.Puri, S.K.MEHTA, S.N.KACKAR, SUSHIL KUMAR

Headnote:Suit on mortgage — Decreed in terms of compromise with stipulation to repay amount within specified date — Parts of disputed property leased — On default property sold in auction — rights of auction purchaser

       – it may be true that Section 52 and Section 65–A, operate in different spheres. Section 65A deals with the powers of the mortgagor to grant lease of the mortgaged property, while the mortgagor remains in lawful possession of the same. Section 52 deals with cases of transfer of or otherwise dealing with any immoveable property after any suit or proceeding in which any right to the said immoveable property is directly and specifically in question has been filed. Section 65A is made “subject to”, “notwithstanding the provisions” contained in Section 52. Section 52, will, however, be only applicable, if the requirements of the said section are satisfied. In the case of Dev Raj Dogra v. Gyan Chand Jain, AIR 1981 SC 981 = 1981 SCWR 129 = 1981(2) SCC 675 = 1981 UJ (SC) 641 = 1981 BLJR 412, it was not necessary to consider whether the grant of any lease by a mortgagor in conformity with the provisions of Section 65A during the pendency of a suit by the mortgagor to enforce the mortgage will attract the provisions of Section 52 or will be outside the mischief of the provisions of the said section on the ground that the creation of such a lease may not affect the rights of the mortgagee under any decree or order which may be passed in the suit. In the case of Mangru Mahto v. Taraknath Tarkeshwar Math, AIR 1967 SC 1390 = 1967(3) SCR 125, this question was not decided and left open. In the present case an outside auction purchaser is seeking recovery of the physical possession of the property purchased by him at the auction from the appellants who are in possession of different portions of the said premises as tenants of the said portions. The auction purchaser was not the mortgagee and he was no party to the suit in which the compromise decree was passed. Section 52 in clear terms speaks of the rights of the parties to the suit or proceedings. The decision in the case of Jayram Mudaliar v. Ayya Swami, AIR 1973 SC 569 may be referred to.

Judgment

A. N. SEN, J. :- The principal question which falls for determination in this appeal by Special Leave granted by this Court, is whether Gyan Chand Jain, the respondent No. 1 in this appeal, who purchased a two and half storeyed bunglow at No 5-C/96, W. E. A. Karol Bagh, New Delhi, at an auction sale held pursuant to the terms of the compromise decree between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, is entitled to recover actual physical possession of the portions in the occupation of the appellants as lessees, the leases in respect of which were created after the decree in the mortgage suit by consent between the parties had been passed, in an application made by the auction-purchaser Gyan Chand Jain under O. XXI, Rr. 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. There is no serious dispute with regard to the facts material for the purpose of this appeal. Des Raj Agarwal, the sole proprietor of M/s. Raj Kumar & Co. mortgaged the 2 1/2 storeyed bunglow No. 5-C/96, WEA, Karol Bagh, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the premises) along with various other properties with Oriental Bank of Commerce (hereinafter referred as the Bank) on 28-6-1960 by deposit of title deeds. The Bank filed a suit to recover its dues on the mortgage on 6-11-1962. On 3-9-1963, a decree was passed by consent of the parties in favour of the plaintiff-mortgagee for the sum of Rupees 4,79,177.49 with costs and future interest at 6 till realisation of the decretal amount . The other relevant terms of the consent decree which are contained in Cls. 8 and 9 of the compromise are to the following effect :

"8. If the judgment-debtor pays Rupees 4,79,177.49 less costs and interest as after March. 1961 within two years of the decree, then whole of the decree shall stand satisfied.

9. If full amount of the decree with costs and interest is not paid as agreed above, within two years of the decree, then the decree-holder shall be free to enforce the decree against the property mortgaged which shall be sold in execution of the same and the decree-holder shall be entitled to proceed against other property and person of the judgment-debtor in the case of the proceeds of the property not being sufficient to satisfy the decree."

After the decree had been passed on 3-9-1963, it appears that the judgment-debtor leased out different portions of the premises to Dev Raj Dogra, Ish Kumar Khosla and Balwant Singh, the appellants herein, in 1966, 1967 and 1970 respectively. The judgment-debtor failed to make payment of the decretal dues in terms of the provisions contained in the consent decree and the premises in question were sold by public auction on 28-10-1971. Gyan Chand Jain whose bid was the highest, was declared to be the purchaser of the premises and the sale in his favour was confirmed on 6-8-1973. On 25-10-76 an application was made on behalf of Gyan Chand Jain, the auction-purchaser, in the Delhi High Court under O. XXI, Rr. 95 and 96 and also Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the following reliefs :

(i) Warrants of possession with the direction that vacant physical possession of the entire property be delivered to the applicant, be issued and vacant physical possession of the entire property be got delivered to the applicant;

(ii) In case the Honble Court comes to a conclusion that the applicant is not entitled to vacate physical possession of any part of the property symbolic possession of that part of the property be granted to him;

(iii) Notices be issued to the persons mentioned in para 9 above to show cause why vacant physical possession of the portions of the property in their occupation be not delivered to the applicant.

The three tenants who were in possession of the respective portions leased out to them and on whom notices had been served, contested the said application. A learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court passed an order of physical possession of the soid portions in the respective occupation of the tenants, the appellants before us, to be m

















































Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top