Judgment

S. M. FAZAL ALI, J.:- These petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution have been filed in order to challenge the vires of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 1955 Act) as also various amendments made to the said Act up to 1977. The first plank of argument related to the constitutional validity of the 1955 Act. The second plank of argument was confined to the validity of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 1972) which was in the nature of a Ceiling Act prescribing a particular ceiling of the area of land which could be retained by the tenant. So far as the Ceiling Act, viz., the Amendment Act of 1972 is concerned, it is conceded by the counsel for the petitioners that the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Act is clearly concluded by a recent decision of this Court in Waman Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 271, where a Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various Ceiling Acts passed by the States concerned. In view of this decision the learned counsel for the petitioners was fair enough to state that he does not want to press his contention regarding the constitutional validity of the Ceiling Act. Similarly, the learned counsel for the petitioners fairly conceded that as the 1955 Act, along with its amendments up to 1972, has been placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, it was immune from challenge and was saved by the protective umbrella contained in Art. 31-B of the Constitution. In this connection, this position was made absolutely clear in Waman Raos case (supra) where this Court observed as follows :

"Thus, in so far as the validity of Article 31-B read with the Ninth Schedule is concerned, we hold that all Acts and Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 1973 will receive the full protection of Art. 31-B. Those laws and regulations will not be open to challenge on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution."

2. In the instant case, it is clear that the 1955 Act as also the Amendment Act of 1972 were added to the Ninth Schedule, being Entry Nos. 60 and 81, prior to April 24, 1973. In these circumstances, it is manifest that the aforesaid Acts are completely immune from challenge on the ground that they are violative of any of the rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, was fully justified in making the concession before us.

3. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners in W. P. No. 1345 of 1979. which has been adopted by the counsel for the petitioners appearing in other petitions, centres round the validity of-

(1) The West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1977 (published in the Gazette Extraordinary on 3-2-1978), and (2) Section 20-B, sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of the 1955 Act. So far as the challenge to the constitutional validity of this section was concerned, it was confined only on the ground that the said sub-sections were violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India as being discriminatory and arbitrary.

4. It was contended that once the land holder, viz., the tenant was given the right of personal cultivation and was permitted to get the land cultivated by a Bargadar on the basis that the bargadar would share half the produce, there was no warrant for not allowing the tenant to resume the land where the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the land. In order to consider this argument, it may be necessary to examine the status of the bargadar under the 1955 Act. Section 2 (2) defines bargadar thus :

"Bargadar means a person who under the system generally known as adhi, barga or bhag cultivates the land of another person on condition of delivering a share of the produce of such land to that pe