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1981 Supreme(SC) 294

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK, AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.*
Hasmat Rai and another, Appellants
Versus
Raghunath Prasad, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 1108 of 1976, D/- 28-4-1981.
Advocates appeared
M/s. S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. S. Anam, Advocates, for Appellants; Mr. P. P. Juneja, Advocate, for Respondent.

Advocates:
E.M.S.ANAM, P.M.Puri, P.P.JUNEJA, S.K.MEHTA

Headnote:(1) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP)-S. 12 (1) (e) & (f) bonafide requirement-landlord must allege and prove the requirement-the requirement must be at the time of the suit and must continue till the decree of the final Court.

       If a landlord bonafide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non residential purpose if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the Court which would be his cause of action But that is not sufficient, This requirement must continue through-out the progress of the litigation and must exist on date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final Court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Restriction Act. [Para 14]

       (2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP)-Ss 2 (i) & 12 (1)-decree of eviction passed by the trial Court -the tenant continues to have the protection in appeal-definition of, tenant' in the Act cannot take away the protections in the appeal against the decree of eviction passed by the lower Court.

       What the definition of 'tenant' excludes from its operation is the person against whom the decree or order for eviction is made and the decree or order has become final in the sense that it is not open to further adjudication by a Court or hierarchy of Courts. An appeal is a continuation of suit. Therefore a tenant against whom a decree for eviction is passed by the trial Court does not lose protection if he files the appeal because if appeal is allowed the umbrella of statutory protection shields him. Therefore it is indisputable that the decree or order for eviction referred to in the definition of tenant must mean final decree or final order of eviction. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of suit, the landlord's need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If, the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events it would be open to him to point out such event and the Court including the appellate Court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage. 1971 JLJ 772 overruled. (1975) 3 SCC 958 relied on. [Para 14]

       (3) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP)-S. 12 (1) (e)-suit for eviction on the ground of requirement-plaintiff must prove that he has no other reasonable accommodation of his own in his occupation in the town-silence on this point-is fatal to the suit.

       Section 12 (1) (e) specifically provides for a landlord obtaining possession of a building let for residential purposes if he bona fide require the same for own use and occupation. But there is an additional condition he must fulfil, namely, he must further show that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. Utter silence of the landlord on this point would be a compelling circumstance for the Court to go in search for some imaginary requirement of the landlord of accommodation for his residence. [Para 16]

       (4) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP)-S. 12 (1) (f) - finding as to genuine requirement-such finding when not binding on Supreme Court.

       One impermissible approach to the facts of the case on hand is avoided although facts found by the Courts are acceptable as sacrosanct, yet in view of the incontrovertible position that emerges from evidence itself that the landlord has acquired major portion of the building in which be can start his business, he is not entitled to an such extra space under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. [Para 16]

       (5) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP)-Ss. 18 & 12 (1) (h)-case of landlord proved only to be under section 12 (1) (h)-matter should be examined keeping in view sections 18 and 12 (1) (h). [Para 18]

       (6) Appeal-is continuation of the suit-decree of the lower Court loses finality on filing of the appeal. [Para 14]

       (7) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP)-Ss. 12 (1) (f) & 2 (i)-subsequent events-personal requirement did not continue till the second appeal as landlord acquired possession from another tenant in the house-such portion large enough to meet the need of the landlord-the High Court should take notice of such subsequent event-Civil P.C. 1908-O. 7, R. 7. [Para 14]

Judgment

DESAI, J.:- A tenant under decree of eviction is the appellant in this appeal by special leave.

2. Respondent landlord filed a suit for recovery of possession of premises being a small shop admeasuring 7 x 22 forming part of a big non-residential building situated in Sadar Bazar, Bilaspur town in Madhya Pradesh on two grounds, to wit: (i) that he (landlord) intended to open a medicine shop and he had no other reasonably suitable accommodation for the same in the town; and (ii) that he (landlord) required the suit building for the purpose of reconstruction and repairs which could not be carried out unless it was vacated by the defendant. The tenant resisted the suit pointing out that the landlord on his own admission as set out in plaint para 4 was in possession of a major portion of a non-residential building of which he acquired possession from the firm of Goraldas Parmanand which accommodation was sufficient for starting the business of Chemists and Druggists shop. It was also contended that the buillng was not in a dilapidated condition and did not need reconstruction and repairs.

3. The trial Court recorded a finding that the building was in a dilapidated condition and reconstruction of it was essential and the landlord had sufficient funds to undertake reconstruction. On the question of personal requirement of plaintiff to start a medicine shop, the trial Court recorded a finding that in the front portion of the building landlord would start his business as Chemists and Druggists and the rear of the building would be utilized by him for his residence. It was further held that as the landlords requirement was a composite one in that he wanted to reconstruct the building and then use the whole of it for himself, therefore, the tenant was not entitled to be inducted in the reconstructed building which he would have been entitled to claim under Section 18 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Act for short).

4. An appeal by the tenant to the District Court elicited in para 20 a finding that though the landlord was studying he might choose his career for business after he completed his education and he had got Rs. 8,000/- in a fixed deposit account in a bank and even though he obtained a decree against the firm of M/s. Goraldas Parmanand he had not go actual possession as the litigation was still pending and, therefore, the plaintiffs requirement of the whole building was established. The finding that the house was in dilapidated condition and required reconstruction was affirmed.

5. When the matter reached the High Court in second appeal by the tenant an application under Order VI Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code was made praying for an amendment to the written statement alleging that the firm Goraldas Parmanand has vacated, the whole of the remaining portion of the building excluding the premises in possession of the tenant measuring 7 x 22 and that the plaintiff has obtained actual possession of the same and if this aspect was taken into consideration the plaintiff landlord would not be entitled to a decree for eviction under S. 12 (1) (f) of the Act. The High Court rejected the application observing that the adjoining portion occupied by firm Goraldas Parmanand was vacated by the firm as far back as in the year 1972 and therefore the application for amendment filed 31/2 years after the filing of the appeal must be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. Further, despite the judgment of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) 3 SCR 958 the High Court felt considerable hesitation in taking note of this event subsequent to the passing of the decree for eviction by the trial Court because of its earlier decision in Taramal v. Laxman Sewak 197 MPLJ 888, in which it was held that the definition of tenant in the Act would not enable a tenant, though in possession but against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made, to invite the Court to take notice of events s












































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