The High Court cannot inquire into the adequacy of the materials on which a detention order under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 is based.

Judgment

BAHARUL ISLAM, J. :- This appeal by special leave is by the State of Gujarat and is directed against the judgment and order of the Gujarat High Court quashing the order of detention passed by the appellant against the respondent.

2. The facts material for the purpose of disposal of this appeal and not disputed before us may be stated in a narrow compass. ,In exercise of powers conferred on it by sub-section. (1) of S. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter called the Act), the appellant passed the order of detention dated 7th May, 1979 against the respondent on the grounds that the respondent and three others, namely, Hasan Haji Ismail Subhania. Gulam Hussein Hasan Subhania and Salemamad Allarakha Jasraya were found in a trawler containing eight packages with 4,645 contraband wrist watches valued at Rs. 10,48,700.00. The petitioner and Salemamad were members of the crew. Hasan Haji was the owner of the trawler and his son Gulam Hussein, was the tindal of the vessel. They were intercepted by the Customs Authorities who seized the contraband, goods and the trawler. The petitioner made a statement on 21st Jan.. 1979 before the Customs officer. admitting that he was a member of the crew but denied any knowledge of the contraband goods. He stated, that he was engaged as a member of the crew by the owner on the daily-wage basis at the rate of Rs. 10/- per day. it was. also stated in the grounds that in the statement dated 21st Jan. 1979, the respondent admitted that he was the tindal of the vessel Shahe-Nagina which had been seized by the Customs officer in 1977 for smuggling wrist watches and that a penalty of Rs. 5,000/- was levied against him.

3. The respondent moved the High Court of Gujarat. A Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order quashed the order of detention, on the. ground that the respondent at the time of joining the vessel as a member of the crew had no "full knowledge that the vessel was to be used for smuggling activity". The High Court held, "the above material on the record, therefore. was not sufficient for reaching a genuine satisfaction that the petitioner was engaged in smuggling activity and it was necessary to detain him with a view, to preventing him from indulging in that activity in future" (Emphasis added) . According to the High Court, "the satisfaction reached by the detaining authority cannot be said to be genuine on the material which was, placed before the detaining. authority".

4. At the outset Mr. Rana. Appearing for the respondent as amicus curiae raises a preliminary objection. The objection is that in view of the fact that the maximum period of detention mentioned in S. 10 of the Act has expired, and as such the appeal has become infructuous. It may be mentioned, to appreciate the preliminary objection. that the order of detention against the respondent was made on 7th May. 1979 and this appeal was being heard on 15th Sept., 1981. which was beyond two years. Section 10 of the Act is in the following terms:

"The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions of Sec. 9 do not apply and which has been confirmed under Cl. (f) of S. 8 shall be a period of one year from the date of detention or, the specified period, whichever period expires later, and the maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order. to which the provisions of S. 9 apply and which has been confirmed under Cl. (f) of S. 8 read with sub-section (2) of S. 9 shall be a-period of two years, from the date of detention or the. specified period. whichever period expires later."

We have not been told by Mr. Rana whether the first part or the second part of Section 10 applies to the facts of the case. He has made the submission on the assumption that the second part of Section 10 applies and the period of two years prescribed by the second part already exp