Judgment

MISRA, J.:- The present appeal by special leave is directed against the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated 23rd of September, 1976. The sole question for consideration in this appeal is whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit giving rise to the present appeal.

2. There is an old institution known as Edroos Dargah of Hazrat Sayedina Mohomed-Bin Abdulla El-Edroos at Surat. Village Orma is an inam village held by the said institution. The dispute in the present case relates to the property of the said village Orma comprising its soil, trees. lanes. roads together with cultivated lands of about 1093 acres with land revenue alienated (aggregating?) Rs. 2,747.10.5. Pursuant to the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act. 1952 (Act 42 of 1953) hereinafter referred to as the 1952 Act, the State of Bombay and after the re-organisation of States, the State, of Gujarat, declared that the said Act was applicable to village Orma from lst of August, 1955 and, therefore, the exemption from the payment of land revenue was extinguished from the 1st of August, 1955. Accordingly the State of Bombay through its Mamlatdar of Olpad sent a notice to the Sajjadanashin of the institution to that effect and also demanded the village records from his possession. He also proceeded to take further and consequential action and declared that the rights of the institution in public roads, lanes, village site and land etc. are extinguished. In the circumstances the Sajadanashin was obliged to file the suit which was later on numbered as suit No. 9 of 1956.

3. The stand of the plaintiff is that village Orma was an inam village held by the religious institution of Edrooe Dargah and the provisions of Section 4 of the 1952 Act have no application in view of Clause (2) of Section 3 of the said Act. The defendant State contested the suit on grounds inter alia that the village in question was a personal inam within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (e) of the 1952 Act and the State Government alone is competent to decide the question whether the grant is a personal inam or not and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question.

4. The pleadings of the parties gave rise to fourteen issues and the Trial Court decided all the substantial issues against the plaintiff. Consequently it dismissed the suit holding that the inam in question was personal inam.

5. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff went up in appeal to the High Court. The appeal came up for hearing before a learned single Judge. He took up the question of jurisdiction first. The stand of the plaintiff-appellant was that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and in support of his contention he placed reliance on Sayed Mohmed Baquir El-Edroos v. State of Bombay. (1966) 7 Guj LR 217. The learned single Judge. however, doubted the correctness of the proposition laid down in that case and referred the case to a larger Bench and it was eventually decided by a Full Bench of that Court.

6. It appears that during the pendency of the appeal another Act was passed known as the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969 (Act 16 of 1969) hereinafter referred to as the 1969 Act. It came into force on 15th of November, 1969. By this Act devasthan inams or inams held by religious and charitable institutions were also abolished, The inevitable result of the 1961 Act is that whether the inam in question is a personal inam or a devasthan inam it cannot subsist. The plea of the plaintiff on the basis of which he filed the suit, was no more available to him after the passing of the latter Act. But the question was still to be enquired into because if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing that the inam in question was a religious or charitable inam, it would be abolished only by the 1969 Act and. therefore, the plaintiff will be entitled to all the benefits of devasthan inam open to him till the enforcement of that Act. The High Court, therefo