JUDGMENT

FAZAL ALI, J.:— This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated February 20, 1980 of the Delhi High Court decreeing the landlords suit for ejectment of the tenant.

2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation are summarised in the judgments of the Rent Controller and the High Court and need not be repeated.

3. Shorn of details, the position seems to be that Baldev Singh took the premises, on rent on May 12, 1961 at a monthly rental of Rs. 95/-. At the time when the tenancy started, the tenant was living in the tenanted house with his father, mother, two sisters and a brother. The tenant himself was at that time a bachelor but seems to have married subsequently. One of his sisters was married in this very house.

4. As it happened, in1971 the tenant went to Canada followed by his wife and children. It is alleged that after having gone to Canada, the husband along with his wife took up some employment there. Admittedly, the tenant did not return to India after 1971. While leaving for Canada the tenant had left his mother and brother in the house who were regularly paying rent to the landlord. There is some controversy as to whether or not the mother and brother, who were left behind, were being supported by the tenant or were living on their own earnings or by the income of the property left by the tenant in India. Such a controversy, however, is of no consequence in deciding the question of law which arises for consideration in this case.

5. On Sept. 27, 1972 the landlord filed an application for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and non-residence of the tenant under clauses (d) and (e) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)- The fundamental plea taken by the landlord was that with the exit of the tenant from the house it became vacant and his mother and brother who were left behind could not be treated as members of the family. Hence, in the eye of law the tenanted premises must be deemed to have fallen vacant.

6. The suit was resisted by the mother, brother and sister of the tenant who averred that even if the tenant along with his wife and children had shifted to Canada, the non-applicants were continuing to live in the tenanted prermises and as they had been paying rent to the landlord regularly, who had been accepting the same, no question of the tenancy becoming vacant arose.

7. Thus, the entire case hinges on the interpretation of the word family as also clauses (d) and (e) of S. 14 (1) of the Act. So far as cl. (e) is concerned, both the courts below found as a fact that the landlord was not able to prove his bona fide necessity. Therefore, as far as ground (e) is concerned, the same no longer survives in view of the findings of fact recorded by the courts below. The only question that remains to be considered is whether the landlord can bring his case for eviction within the ambit of cl. (d) of S. 14 (1) which may be extracted thus :

"14. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant :

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-

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(d) that the premises were let for use as a residence and neither the tenant nor any member of his family has been residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the application for the recovery of possession thereof."

8. A close analysis of this provision would reveal that before the landlord can succeed, he must prove three esgential ingredients

(1) that the premises were let out for use as a residence,

(2) that the tenant after having taken the premises has ceased to reside, and

(3) that a