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1982 Supreme(SC) 135

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. PATHAK, O. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.**
Reynold Rajamani and another, Appellants
Versus
Union of India and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 2631 of 1982
Decided on 30-7-1982.
Advocates appeared
Miss. Lily Thomas, M/s. K. S. Gill and S. K. Arora, Advocates, for Appellants; Mr. S. T. Desai, Sr. Advocate, Miss A. Subhashini, Advocate with him, for Respondents.

Advocates:
A.Subhashini, K.S.Gill, LILY THOMAS, S.K.Arora, S.T.DESAI

Headnote:

Special Marriage Act - Section 28 - Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 - Section 1 (2) (d) - Indian Divorce Act, 1869 - Section 7 – Divorce - Appellants contends that trial Court and High Court art wrong and that in reading Section 7 of Act, 1869 provisions of S. 1 (2) (d) of Act, 1973 must be deemed to be incorporated therein and therefore appellants are entitled to the benefit of ground for divorce so forth in the latter enactment. In deference to counsel for appellant submissions and having regard to importance of the question we heard her at length but we indicated that the point raised by her did not carry conviction, and we reserved judgment in order to give a fully reasoned order - Whether a provision for divorce by mutual consent should be included in the Indian Divorce Act is a matter of legislative policy - Whether it is mutual consent, irretrievable break down of the marriage, or even the fault of the woman herself – Held, Courts cannot extend or enlarge legislative policy by adding a provision to statute which was never enacted there - Every divorce solves a problem and creates another. Both problems need to be solved, no matter who is responsible for the break down of the marriage. If divorce law is to be a real success, it should make. provision for the economic independence of female spouse. After all, Indian society today is so constituted that a woman is generally helpless and her position, becomes worse if she is divorced - It is necessary that the law should protect her interests even if she be an erring spouse, lest she becomes destitude and a dead loss to society -Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT

PATHAK, J. (for himself and Baharul Islam, J.):— The appellants, who belong to the Roman Catholic Community, were married on December 30, 1967 in Podannur in the State of Tamil Nadu under S. 27 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872. On July 26, 1979 they put in a joint petition under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act for a decree of divorce by mutual consent in the Court of the learned District Judge, Delhi. On March 11, 1980 the trial Court dismissed the petition on the ground that Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act could not be availed of. The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi which having been dismissed they proceeded in appeal to this Court. In the appeal they applied for permission to amend the joint petition to enable them to rely upon Sec. 7 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 read with Section 1 (2) (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 of England. The amendment was allowed, and the appellants filed an amended joint petition in the trial Court seeking divorce on the ground that they had been living separately for more than two years and had not been able to live together and their marriage had broken down irretrievably and therefore they were entitled to a decree of divorce under the aforesaid provisions. On August. 16, 1980 the trial Court dismissed the .petition holding that the appellants were not entitled to rely on Section 1 (2) (d) of the English statute. The appellants took the matter to the High Court of Delhi and the High Court has affirmed the view taken by the trial Court.

2. In this appeal Miss Lily Thomas, appearing for the appellants, contends that the trial Court and the High Court art wrong and that in reading Section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 the provisions of S. 1 (2) (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 must be deemed to be incorporated therein and therefore the appellants are entitled to the benefit of the ground for divorce so forth in the latter enactment. In deference to Miss Thomass vehement submissions and having regard to the importance of the question we heard her at length but we indicated that the point raised by her did not carry conviction, and we reserved judgment in order to give a fully reasoned order. Shortly thereafter, Miss Thomas put in an application asserting that she had information that the Government of India was proposing to amend the matrimonial law in relation to the Christian community in India and praying that in the circumstances judgment may not be delivered for some time. There has, however, been no change in the law since, and it is appropriate, we think, that judgment should be pronounced now without further delay.

3. The main contention raised by Miss Thomas is that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of S.7 of The Indian Divorce Act and therefore, by reason of that provision, to rely on Section 1 (2) (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. There is no doubt that if the provisions of Section 1 (2) (d) of the English statute can be read in Section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act and the appellants can establish that the conditions set forth in Section 1 (2) (d) are made out the appellants will be entitled to claim a decree of divorce. But we are not satisfied that Section 1 (2) (d) of the English statute can be read in S. 7 of the Indian Divorce Act. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section I of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 provides :

"(1) Subject to Section 3 below, a petition for divorce may be presented to the Court by either party to a marriage on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.

(2) The Court bearing a petition for divorce shall not hold the marriage to have broken down irretrievably unless the petitioner satisfies the Court of one or more of the following facts, that is, to say

(a) that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent;

(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be




















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