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1981 Supreme(SC) 482

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.
Idandas, Appellant
Versus
Anant Ramchandra Phadke (dead) by L.Rs., Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 2383 of 1977
Decided on 20-11-1981.
Advocates appeared
M/s. Gobind Ram Bhatia, R. C. Bhatia, and P.C. Kapoor, Advocates, for Appellant.

Advocates:
Gobind Ram Bhatia, P.C.KAPUR, R.C.BHATIA

Headnote:Transfer of Property Act – Sec. 106 - Evidence Act, Sec. 101 - Onus whether least is for manufacturing purpose is on the defendant - Manufacturing purpose means that certain commodity should be so transformed either by labour or machinery so as to lose its original character and should have a different name and put to a different use - Six month's notice required for termination of lease. (Para 6, 7 & 10)

JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT:— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated Dec. 24, 1975 (18th Nov., 1976?)

2. The short point of law involved in this case is whether the lease in question granted by the landlord to the appellant-tenant was a lease for manufacturing purposes. In case the lease was for a purpose of manufacture then it is manifest that under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the lease could be terminated only by giving six months notice.

3. The suit was contested by the defendant-tenant. The plaintiffs case was that the tenancy was from month to month and, therefore, a months notice to terminate the tenancy was sufficient and the provision under S. 106 of the T. P. Act was not attracted. The plaintiff also denied that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. The High Court upheld the judgment of the District Judge holding that the lease was not for a manufacturing purpose and held that the tenancy was rightly terminated as the notice was valid.

4. Mr. Gobind Ram Bhatia, learned counsel for the appellant-tenant, has submitted a short point of law before us. He submits that having regard to the process of manufacturing carried on by the defendant, there can be no doubt that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose and could be terminated only by six months notice under S. 106 of the T. P. Act. Notice was issued to the respondents. That notice was duly served on them. There is a certificate given by the High Court of Bombay itself that the notice on the respondents was served. Nobody has appeared for the respondents to contest this appeal.

5. In the present case, the admitted facts are as under:

1. That to begin with the lease was given to the defendant in respect of an open piece of land,

2. That on the open piece of land the appellant installed a flour mill and that the defendant was not using the land for any other purpose except running a flour mill.

3. That the receipts filed by the tenant clearly show that the lease was doubtless a yearly one.

6. Reliance was placed by the District Judge on the counterfoil where the plaintiff-landlord tried to make out a case of monthly tenancy but the entry in the counter-foil being an admission in his own favour was not admissible against the appellant. On the other hand, the trial court has pointed out at page (?) of its judgment that the receipts produced by the tenant clearly show that the rent used to be paid from year to year. Exhibits 24 to 26 pertained to the rent paid on an yearly basis right from 1959 to May 31, 1961. On point of fact, therefore, we are satisfied that in the instant case the lease was from year to year and, therefore, a months notice was not legal if the lease was for a manufacturing purpose.

7. The second point which arises for decision is as to the purpose of the lease. This point is no longer res integra and is concluded by a clear authority of this Court in Allenburry Engineers Private Ltd. v. Ramakrishna Dalmia, (1973) 2 SCR 257 : (AIR 1973 SC 425) where this Court has laid down that the expression "manufacturing purposes" in S. 106 of the T. P. Act must be used in its popular and dictionary meaning as the statute has not defined the word "manufacturing purposes". We might state that in the present set up of our socialistic pattern of society when our country has made strong strides in various spheres of industrial activities an industrial venture must be given the most liberal interpretation so as to subserve the object of the statute. Of course the burden of proof whether the purpose of the lease was a manufacturing purpose would be on the defendant but we are satisfied that the defendant in this case has amply discharged its onus. In the aforesaid case this Court observed as follows (at p. 427 of AIR) :

"The word manufacture, according to its dictionary meaning, is the making of articles or material (now on large scale) by physical labour or mechanical power. (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. I











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