JUDGMENT

FAZAL ALI, J.:— This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated Nov. 23, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court allowing a writ petition quashing the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and remanding the case to him for considering. the question afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made by the High Court.

2. The appeal involves a short and simple point but the case appears to have had rather a long and chequered career. Put briefly, the facts of the case fall. within a narrow compass so far as the points for decision are concerned. The first respondent, Smt. Rajkumari Jain, inducted Shri Thapalayal as a tenant in the premises in dispute which are situated in the town of Bijnor. The tenant intimated his intention to the Rent Control & Eviction Officer to vacate the premises on 25-6-1974. On receipt of the aforesaid application of the tenant a Rent Control Inspector was directed to visit the spot and after visiting the same he reported that the premises in question were likely to fall vacant on 9-6-1974. The prescribed authority by its Order dated 1-6-1974 allotted the premises to the appellant. In fact, the appellant had applied to the authority on 20-5-1974 for allotment of the accommodation to him. It appears that these proceedings were taken behind the back of the repondent-landlady who was not taken into confidence either by the appellant or by the Rent Control authorities. It was only after the prescribed authority had allotted the premises to the appellant and the respondent-landlady came to know of this fact that she moved the prescribed authority for cancellation of the allotment but her prayer was rejected.

3. Thereafter, the landlady filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Bijnor which was allowed and the allotment in favour of the appellant was cancelled on the ground that the provisions of S. 17 (2) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were not complied with. Before narrating further sequence of facts, it may be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. S. 17 (2) of the Act may be extracted thus :

"Where a part of a building is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes or is released in his favour under cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 16 for residential purposes, the allotment of the remaining part thereof under cl. (a) of the said sub-sec. (1) shall be made in favour of a person nominated by the landlord :"

4. A perusal of this statutory provision would clearly disclose that the object of the Act was that where a tenant inducted by the landlord voluntarily vacates the premises, which are a part of the building occupied by the landlord, an allotment in the vacancy should be made only to a person nominated by the landlord. The dominant purpose to be sub-served by the Act is manifestly the question of removing any inconvenience to the landlord by imposing or thrusting on the premises an unpleasant neighbor or a tenant who invades the right of privacy of the landlord. It is obvious that if the tenant has vacated the premises by himself and not at the instance of the landlord, there is no question of the landlord occupying the said premises because he has act a separate remedy for evicting the tenant on the ground of personal necessity. The statute however, while empowering the prescribed authority to allot the accommodation, safeguards at least the right of the landlord to have a tenant of his choice.

5. In the instant case, the admitted position seems to be that when the prescribed authority allotted the premises to the appellant, the landlady was not taken into confidence nor was she asked to induct either the appellant or somebody else as the tenant of the premises which were likely to fall vacant or which may have fallen vacant. This was undoubtedly an essential requirement of the provisions of S. 17 (2) of the Act as extracted above.