Judgment

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. :- By a notification dated 31-1-1968, the Delhi Municipal Corporation purported to enhance the fee for slaughtering animals in its slaughter houses from Re. 00.25 p. to Rs. 2.00 for each animal, in the case of sheep, goats and pigs, and from Rupees 1.00 to Rs. 8.00 for each animal, in the case of buffaloes. The notification was quashed by the High Court of Delhi on the ground that the Corporation was really proposing to levy a tax under the guise of enhancing the fee. The original rates were fixed in March 1953 and the revised rates were to take effect from February 1, 1968. Some butchers of the city questioned the revision of rates on the ground that the proposed enhanced fee was wholly disproportionate to the cost of the services and supervision and was in fact not a fee, but a tax. The High Court accepted the contention of the butchers on what appears to us a superficial view of the facts and principles. Fortunately, the High Court has certified the case as a fit one for appeal under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution and the matter is now before us.

2. During the pendency of the writ petitions in the High Court, by virtue of interim arrangement, the Municipal Corporation was permitted to collect fee at the rate of Re. 00.50 p. per animal in the case of sheep, goats and pigs and Rupees 2.00 per animal in the case of buffaloes. As a result, the Municipal Corporation realised a sum of Rs. 4,24,494/- by way of fee for slaughtering animals in its slaughter houses. Now, the budget of the Municipal Corporation under Itam XIV-B showed a sum of Rs. 2,56,000/- as the expenditure involved in connection with the slaughter houses. Comparing the amount of actual realisation of fee at the rates permitted by the Court with the amount of expenditure as revealed by the budget and excluding from consideration all expenditure not shown in the budget under Item XIV-B, the High Court came to the conclusion that even if the original fee was doubled the amount realised would be more than sufficient to meet the expenditure involved and there was, therefore, no warrant at all for increasing the fee eight-fold. So, it was said, the proposed fee was no fee but a tax for which there was no legislative mandate. We shall presently point out the error into which the High Court fell on facts as well as principle.

3. A word on interpretation. Vicissitudesof time and necessitudes of history contribute to changes of philosophical attitudes, concepts, ideas and ideals and, with them, the meaning of words and phrases and the language itself. The philosophy and the language of the law are no exceptions. Words and phrases take colour and character from the context and the times and speak differently in different contexts and times, And, it is worthwhile remembering that words and phrases have not only a meaning but also a content, a living content which breathes, and so, expands and contracts. This is particularly so where the words and phrases properly belong to other disciplines. Tax and Fee are such words. They properly belong to the world of Public Finance but since the Constitution and the laws are also concerned with Public Finance, these words have often been adjudicated upon in an effort to discover their content.

4. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, (1954 SCR 1005) is considered the locus classicus on the subject of the contradistinction between tax and fee. The definition of tax given by Latham, C. J. as "a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and not payment for services rendered" was accepted, by the Court as stating the essential characterstics of a tax. Turning to fees, it was said "a fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency", but it was confessed, "as there may be various kinds of fee, it is not possible to formulate a definition that would be