Judgment

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.:- Rana Partap, Manmohan alias Pappi and Sat Pal were tried by the learned Sessions Judge-Karnal-Manmohan for an offence under S. 302 I.P.C. and Rana Partap and Sat Pal for an offence under S. 302 read with S. 34 I.P.C. They were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, but on appeal by the State, the order of acquittal was reversed and they were convicted under S. 302 and S. 302 read with S. 34 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. They have preferred this appeal under the SC Enlargement of Jurisdiction (Criminal) Act.

2. Shri A. N. Mulla and Shri Kohli, learned counsel for the appellants read to us, in extenso, the evidence of all the material witnesses as also the judgments of the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court. They also addressed to us elaborate arguments. We are satisfied that the High Court did not overstep the bounds of their jurisdiction or sidestep the principles to be observed in dealing with appeals against orders of acquittal. We are also satisfied that the learned Sessions Judge was patently in error in acquitting the accused and that he entertained doubts where none existed. The High Court was quite right in reversing the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge as wholly unreasonable. Shri Mulla repeated all the points upon which the learned Sessions Judge relied to reject the case of the prosecution. Everyone of these points is so trivial that neither singly nor cumulatively can they be considered sufficient to discard the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. We consider that it would be a vain exercise in futility to ostentatiously consider each one of these inconsequential contentions only to reject them out of hand. We may however, mention a ground or two to illustrate the superficial approach and the unreal appreciation of evidence by the learned Sessions Judge.

3. There were three eye-witnesses. One was the brother of the deceased and the other two were a milk vendor of a neighbouring village, who was carrying milk to the dairy and a vegetable and fruit hawker, who was pushing his laden cart along the road. The learned Sessions Judge and the learned counsel described both the independent witnesses as chance witnesses implying thereby that their evidence was suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. We do not understand the expression chance witnesses. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a brothel, prostitutes and paramours are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that that they are mere chance witnesses. The expression chance witnesses is borrowed from countries where every mans home is considered his castle and every one must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another mans castle. It is a most unsuitable expression in a country whose people are less formal and more casual. To discard the evidence of street hawkers and street vendors on the ground that they are chance witnesses, even where murder is committed in a street, is to abandon good sense and take too shallow a view of the evidence.

4. Another reason given by the learned Sessions Judge to discard the evidence of the milk vendor was that he did not produce the receipt for payment of octroi duty for bringing the milk into the town and that he also admitted that the business was being carried on in the name of his father. The reasoning is so ridiculous as to make further comment unnecessary. What is worse is that even the evidence of the witnesses examined by the accused shows that octroi duty was paid that day in the name of the father, thus virtually corroborating the evidence of the witness.

5. The evidence of the vegetable and fruit hawker was rejected on the ground that he admitt