Judgment

PATHAK, J.:- The petitioner, Shri Binoy Kumar Chatterjee prays for special leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution against the award dated April 27, 1981 of the Second Labour Court, West Bengal.

2. The petitioner was appointed to the post of Sub-editor in the employment of M/s. Jugantar Limited in April 18, 1960. In the following month he was transferred to Delhi as a Special Correspondent. In August, 1976 he was transferred to Calcutta as an Assistant Editor. On completing 60 years of age he was served with a notice of retirement dated Nov. 6, 1976 informing him that he stood retired with effect from Dec. 1, 1976. He was paid and he willingly received his dues on account of gratuity and Provident Fund following such retirement. Thereafter, it seems that he was offered fresh employment as an Assistant Editor for a period of twelve months under a contract. He accepted the employment on that basis. On the expiry of the period of twelve months he raised a dispute alleging that his service had been wrongly terminated with effect from Dec. 1, 1976 and that he was entitled to continue in service.

3. The Government of West Bengal referred the dispute to the Second Labour Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for adjudication on the issue whether the termination of the service of the petitioner was justified, and to what relief was he entitled. The Labour Court considered the preliminary objection of the employer that there was no industrial dispute because the service of the petitioner had come to an end automatically on the expiry of the period of contract. The objection, although described as a preliminary objection, involved the very question which the Labour Court was called upon to decide in the reference. Before the Labour Court the case of the employer was that the services of the petitioner stood terminated automatically with effect from Dec. 1, 1976 on attaining the age of superannuation, that is to say the age of 60 years. Thereafter he was re-employed, the employment being distinct and apart from the employment which ceased on Dec. 1, 1976. The fresh employment, according to the employer was governed by the express condition that it would enure for a period of twelve months only. The case of the workman however, was that the further employment given to him after Dec. 1, 1976 was in reality a continuation of the previous employment and therefore the termination should be taken to be effective from Dec. 1, 1977 and should be regarded as retrenchment. The Labour Court repelled the contention of the workman and held that he had actually retired from service with effect from Dec. 1, 1976, on reaching the age of superannuation and had received his gratuity and Provident Fund. The Labour Court found that the workman had entered into a fresh agreement with the employer under which he was given employment for twelve months, that the contract was duly signed by the petitioner with full knowledge of its contents and consequences and was binding on him, and that on the expiry of the stipulated twelve months the petitioner had automatically ceased to be in service. Accordingly. the Labour Court refused the relief of reinstatement claimed by the petitioner and observed that the case could not be treated as one of retrenchment.

4. Two contentions have been raised before us by learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel urges that there was no binding provision fixing the age of superannuation, and that the provision in the Standing Orders applied by the employer was not sanctioned by any entry in the Schedule to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. It is contended that consequently the petitioner must be deemed to have continued in service throughout and the cesser of his service with effect from Dec. 1, 1977 must be regarded as a unilateral termination of service by the employer. We find no substance in the contention. The respondent employer is a newspaper establishment an