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1984 Supreme(SC) 65

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.
V.S. Talwar, Appellant
Versus
Prem Chandra Sharma, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 2999 of 1980
Decided on 1-3-1984.

Advocates:
A.K.VERMA, D.D.THAKUR, G.L.SANGHI, P.H.Parekh, P.K.MENON, R.K.Sharma, S.KASHVA

Headnote:

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 14 (1) (e) – Tenant - Lease agreement - Order of the eviction - Landlord, appellant before Court applied to Controller on for eviction of respondent under Section 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958 - Tenant obtained leave to contest and pleaded inter alia, that premises were let out both for residential as also office and composite purpose of the tenancy took premises out of the purview of residential accommodation - Controller did not accent defence and passed an order for eviction, Thereupon tenant carried a revision to Delhi High Court and reiterated his defence that tenancy was not for residential purpose - Counsel for appellant took Court to terms of clause 12 of lease agreement and emphasised on feature that commercial purposes were clearly kept out and lease was for residence and authorised location of a personal office - He also relied upon the description of premises as residential in application made by tenant to Controller for fixation of fair rent in respect of the very premises – Held, As contemplated under Transfer of Property Act a document of lease normally provides rights and obligations of both lessor and lessee - In stipulating rent payable for use and occupation of premises lessor had undertaken the liability of payment of taxes as described therein as long as premises were used for residence only - This clause necessarily means that what had been stipulated was only residential user - It is appropriate to take note of admission that lessor had been paying taxes and the lessee has not been called upon to share burden - Tenant has been in occupation and continuing for about 14 years now after the application for eviction had been filed - Ordinarily Court would not have allowed any time to the tenant keeping this aspect in view - But has urged upon Court to take judicial notice of fact that these days an alternative premises would be very difficult to find – Court allow time to tenant until to vacate premises subject to furnishing usual undertaking within four weeks from today - In absence of undertaking tenant becomes liable to eviction after four weeks - Appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT

RANGANATH MISRA, J.:— The landlord whose application for eviction of the tenant, respondent before us. was rejected by the High Court by reversing the order of the eviction passed by the Additional Rent Controller has come before this Court on obtaining special leave and the short point arising for consideration is as to the true meaning of a clause in the rent deed.

2. The respondent was admitted into tenancy of the premises in question under a lease deed dated 5th January, 1968. Clause 12 thereof provided :

"That the lessee shall use the premises for the purpose of Residential / Personal office only and not for commercial purposes." (Underlinings are our own).

The landlord, appellant before us applied to the Controller on March 14, 1972. for eviction of the respondent under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958 (the Act for short). The tenant obtained leave to contest and pleaded inter alia, that the premises were let out both for residential as also office and the composite purpose of the tenancy took the premises out of the purview of residential accommodation. The Controller did not accent the defence and passed an order for eviction, Thereupon the tenant carried a revision to the Delhi High Court and reiterated his defence that the tenancy was not for residential purpose. The High Court found that there, was no infirmity in the finding about the bona fide, requirement but adverting to the conclusion on the letting purpose held:

"It is well known that premises may be let out for residence only for use as an office, for use as a shop and for other commercial purpose. Once any of the latter purposes is combined with the purpose of use as residence. the premises let out for a composite purpose and for residence only.

The meaning of the word office not defined in the Act, in the Chamberss dictionary is a place where business is carried on. Office is certainly not residence and a letting purpose which includes office must be understood to include a purpose other than residence only."

And ultimately concluded by saying :

"Clause (e) of Section 14 (1) is available as a ground to seek eviction of tenants only among other requirements, if the premises were let out for residence only and once the letting purpose is shown to be composite an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e), without more, must fail."

The High Court rejected the landlords submission that the use of the word personal before office was intended to convey the idea that the tenancy was not for the purpose of accommodating a place of business.

3. Counsel for the appellant took us to the terms of clause 12 of the lease agreement and emphasised on the feature that commercial purposes were clearly kept out and the lease was for residence and authorised the location of a personal office. He also relied upon the description of the premises as residential in the application made by the tenant to the Controller for fixation of fair rent in respect of the very premises.

4. The word office is used in different senses and in each case that meaning must be assigned to it which conforms with the language used. In Volume 67, Corpus Juris Secundum at Page 96 the following statement appears: "The term office is one which is employed to convey various meanings and no one definition thereof can be relied on for all purposes and occasions" This Court has approved the observation of Lord Wright in McMillan v. Guest. 1942 AC 561. where it was stated :

"The word office, is of indefinite content. Its various meanings cover four columns of the New English Dictionary.............."

See Smt. Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana. (1970) 2 SCJ 232. In this view of the position the High Court was not right, in picking one of the meanings given to the word in the Chambers dictionary and proceeding to the conclusion that office is certainly not residence and a letting, purpose which includes office must be understood to include a purpose other than residence only.

5. Section 2 (i


















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