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1985 Supreme(SC) 136

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
D.A. DESAI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.
Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari and another, Appellants
Versus
Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 1365 (N) of 1978, D/- 18-4-1985.

Headnote:Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1947, Sec. 11A - Provision is to check the tendency of tenant to protract the litigation by frivolous defences more specially where the duty to pay the rent is unmistakably admitted - It also enables the Court to determine the rate of rent at which the deposit shall be made, where the rate of rent is disputed as also from what date the tenant appear, to be in arrears as also the future rent - The provision is directory and not mandatory - Court is not powerless in the face of harsh facts where striking off the defence would be nothing short of miscarriage of justice. (Para 3 & 8)

       Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 148 - Any period fixed or granted by the Court for doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may hue expired. (Para 10)

       Interpretation of Statute - Use of "Shall"- Use of the word 'Shall' in a provision is not necessarily mandatory - Where in the same provision 'shall' and 'may' is used the word ‘shall’ may not be mandatory - The Intention of the legislature & not the language is decisive of the construction (Para 9)

Judgment

DESAI, J.:- Where a plaintiff in a suit bitterly complains that the defendant would be getting unfair advantage of his own lapse, if we were to interfere with the judgment rendered by the High court, we put ourselves on caution whether such be the outcome of our setting aside the order under appeal. Unwittingly, this Court should not be a party to the conferment of an undeserved advantage of a party to a proceeding guilty of a lapse though remediable and even unintentional. Deeper probing into the facts reveals that the boot is on the other foot in that the respondent-plaintiff is wholly to be blamed for the delay.

2. The facts first. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction against the appellant defendant on the only ground that the tenant committed default in payment of rent for the period May, 1969 to December, 1971. The defendant contested the suit inter alia contending that he was not in default. There followed an application by the respondent-landlord for a direction under Sec. 11 A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Act for short). Section 11 A reads as under

"11A. Deposit of rent by tenants in suits for ejectment - If in a suit for recovery of possession of any building the tenant contests the suit, as regards claim for ejectment, the landlord may make an application at any stage of the suit for order on the tenant to deposit month by month rent at a rate at which it was last paid and also the arrears of rent, if any; and the Court, after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, may make an order for deposit of rent at such rate as may be determined month by month and the arrears of rent, if any, and on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the date of the order or the rent at such rate for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month, the Court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck out and the tenant to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the claim to ejectment. The landlord may also apply for permission to withdraw the deposited rent without prejudice to his right to claim decree for ejectment and the Court may permit him to do so. The Court may further order recovery of cost of suit and such other compensation as may be determined by it from the tenant."

The prayer in the application was that the defendant-tenant be directed to deposit the rent in arrears up to and inclusive of June 1973 within a period of fifteen days from the date of the order and a further direction be given that he should continue to deposit the rent from month to month. The learned Judge made an order directing the appellant to deposit rent for the period up to and inclusive of June 1973 at the rate of Rs. 32/- per month and thereafter to continue to deposit the rent from month to month at the rate of Rs. 12.20 per month. The tenant preferred a revision petition which was dismissed on March 26, 1974. The suit was fixed for hearing on January 28, 1975. The tenant moved an application for adjournment which was rejected. Plaintiffs witnesses were examined and the suit was decreed ex parte on January 30, 1975. On an application moved by the defendant praying for relief under Order IX Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, the learned Judge set aside the ex parte decree and set down the suit for proceeding further from the stage where it was decreed ex parte. On January 5, 1976, the respondent-landlord moved an application praying that as there was irregularity in depositing the rent for the months of August to October, 1975, defence of the appellant be struck off, for his failure to strictly comply with the order made under Section 11A. After the appellant filed his rejoinder, the learned Judge heard the application and rejected the same on the ground that as the earlier order was made prior to the date on which the suit was decreed ex parte, on the setting aside of the ex parte decree and revival of the sui






















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