JUDGMENT

R.S. PATHAK, J. :— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court allowing the respondents writ petition on the finding that the accommodation let out to the appellant must be deemed to be vacant.

2. The respondent is the landlord and the appellant is the tenant of a shop in Mohalla Nan Panjan, Khurja in the district of Bulandshahr. The respondent filed a petition under S. 12 read with S. 16 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 alleging that the accommodation had been sub-let by the appellant to one Yadram, that the appellant had ceased to occupy the shop and had allowed it to be occupied by Yadram and his son Madan Lal, neither of whom was a member of the appellants family. He claimed a declaration that the shop had fallen vacant and that it should be released to him.

3. The Prescribed Authority made an order dated Oct. 30, 1976, rejecting the respondents petition, on the finding that he had failed to prove that the appellant had sublet the shop and that it could be deemed to be vacant. He found that the appellant had established that he was conducting his business of selling vegetables in the shop and that Madan Lal sat in on his behalf. An appeal by the respondent was dismissed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr by his order dated Sept. 21, 1977. He affirmed the findings of the Prescribed Authority.

4. The respondent filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court, and on Aug. 1, 1979 a learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the appellant had been unable to establish any legal relationship of agency between himself and Madan Lal or Yadram and therefore it must be taken that it was Madan Lal who was occupying the shop within the meaning of S. 12(1)(b) of the aforesaid U. P. Act. The High Court also declined to accept the appellants case that the appellant was carrying on the business of selling vegetables when he was already carrying on a brick kiln business and had a cold storage. Holding that the property must be deemed to be vacant it remanded the case to the Prescribed Authority for passing orders on the respondents application for release of the property from allotment.

5. We are satisfied that the High Court travelled outside its jurisdiction in embarking upon a reappraisal of the evidence. The Prescribed Authority as well as the learned Second Additional District Judge concurrently found that Madan Lal was sitting in the shop on behalf of the appellant and deputising for him in carrying on the vegetable selling business. The findings by both authorities rested on evidence, and there was no warrant for disturbing that finding of fact in a writ petition. The limitations on the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are well settled. The writ petition before the High Court prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari, and it is well known that a writ in the nature of certiorari may be issued only if the order of the inferior tribunal or subordinate Court suffers from an error of jurisdiction, or from a breach of the principles of natural justice or is vitiated by a manifest or apparent error of law. There is no sanction enabling the High Court to reappraise the evidence without sufficient reason in law and reach findings of fact contrary to those rendered by an inferior Court or subordinate Court. When High Court proceeds to do so, it acts plainly in excess of its powers. We are informed that a report of the Commissioner in another suit was not considered by the Prescribed Authority and by the learned Second Additional District Judge, and therefore, it is urged the High Court was justified in taking that report into consideration and entering into an examination of the material on the record. We have examined the report of the Commissioner and we find that an objection had been filed to that report and the trial Court had failed to dispose it of. In other words,