SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.B. MISRA AND G.L. OZA, JJ.
Abhinavodhanda Vidya Sankarabharati, Appellant
Versus
Poonapati Ramayogi Reddi and others, Respondents. 1512
Civil Appeal No. 280 (N) of 1971
Decided on 23-4-1986.*
Advocates appeared
Mr. A. Subba Rao and Mr.K. L. Rathee Advocates, for Appellant; Mr. K. Ram Kumar, Mrs. J. Ramachandran, Mr. T. V. S. N. Chari and Miss Vrinda Grover, Advocates, for Respondents.
Constitution of India Article 226 – Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 – Section 3(2)(d), 2 – Special leave against order - Quashed the order - Appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh – By this judgment a Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order of the learned single Judge, dismissing the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and quashed the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal (District Judge) and remanded the case to the Tribunal for fresh decision according to law on the basis of the materials already on record in the following circumstances – Determining whether is an Inam Estate within the meaning of Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936 – Assistant Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal held was not an Inam estate – Later the definition of an Inam Estate was amended and after the amendment, an Inam – Estate, as defined by S. 2(7) includes all Estates within the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act – Assistant Settlement Officer therefore again held a suo motu inquiry to determine whether came within the wider definition of the Inam Estate introduced in 1957 Amendment –Held, Court are reluctant to accept the contentions for obvious reason that the Ryots had participated in the proceedings and had engaged a lawyer who conducted the proceedings up to a certain stage on behalf of the Ryots but subsequently on the date fixed in the case, the counsel failed to appear – It, therefore, cannot be said that the Ryots had no knowledge of the proceedings – They could have enquired if their counsel did not inform them. In any case, they could have filed an application for setting aside the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer on showing sufficient cause for their non-appearance –But that too was not done by the Ryots – After a lapse of about 4 1/2 years they chose to file a writ petition in the High Court on the technical plea that no notice had been served in the appeal filed by the State – If the Ryots really felt aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer they could have themselves gone up in appeal but they did not do so – As a result of the dismissal of the appeal filed by the State the Ryots were not worse off –Tribunal had only confirmed the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer – In the circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the Division Bench has committed a manifest error in quashing the order of the Tribunal after a lapse of 4 1/2 years when the Ryots failed to avail of the alternative remedy open to them – Appeal allowed.
JUDGMENT
R. B. MISRA, J.:— The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated November 27, 1969. By this judgment a Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order of the learned single Judge, dismissing the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and quashed the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal (District Judge) and remanded the case to the Tribunal for fresh decision according to law on the basis of the materials already on record in the following circumstances.
2. A suo motu inquiry under S. 9(1) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition And Conversion into Ryotwari) Act was initiated by the Assistant Settlement Officer in 1958 for determining whether Lingamguntla Agraharam is an Inam Estate within the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936. The Assistant Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal held that Lingamguntla Agraharam was not an Inam estate. Later the definition of an Inam Estate was amended in 1957 and after the amendment, an Inam. Estate, as defined by S. 2(7) includes all Estates within the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The Assistant Settlement Officer therefore again held a suo motu inquiry to determine whether the Lingamguntla Agraharam came within the wider definition of the Inam Estate introduced in 1957 Amendment.
3. Some of the Ryots of the village alleged that the Lingamguntla Agraharam was an Inam Estate within the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of the Act and engaged a counsel who participated in the inquiry on their behalf up to a certain stage but later on failed to appear, with the result that the Assistant Settlement Officer proceeded with the inquiry in the absence of Ryots or their counsel.
4. The Assistant Settlement Officer by his order dated April 6, 1959 came to the conclusion that Lingamguntla Agraharam is not an estate as defined in S. 3(2)(d) and determined the question accordingly.
5. Against the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer, the State of Andhra Pradesh preferred an appeal before the Estates Abolition Tribunal (Guntur). The Ryots however did not file an appeal. The Tribunal agreeing with the findings reached by the Assistant Settlement Officer dismissed the appeal. The Ryots thereupon filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It was contended on their behalf that they were not aware of the appeal preferred by the Government and no notice was served upon any of them as required under the rules and that the moment they came to know about the result of the appeal before the Tribunal on October 11, 1963, they obtained certified copies of the order on October 15, 1963 and filed the writ petition on November 26, l963 invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court.
6. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition on two grounds : (1) that there has been an inordinate delay of 41/2 years in filing the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer; and (2) that the individual notices were not contemplated and, therefore, there was no ground for interference by the Court. The ryots filed a writ appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench allowed the same, set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge, quashed the judgment and order of the Tribunal and remanded the case for decision afresh to the Tribunal on the ground that there has been a flagrant violation of the mandatory rule in not serving the notices on the Ryots in the appeal. The appellant has now approached this Court by special leave.
7. Shri A. Subba Rao, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended firstly, that the delay has defeated the claim of the respondents, and secondly, it was not at all necessary to send individual notices to the Ryots under the rules. We find considerable force in either of the two contentions. The responde
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