SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1986 Supreme(SC) 271

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. PATHAK AND G.L. OZA, JJ.
Tarlok Singh, Appellant
Versus
Municipal Corporation of Amritsar and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 2843 of 1986
 Decided on 20-8-1986.

Advocates:
EJAZ MAQBUL, M.KARANJAVALA, NAUNIT LAL, RAJAN KARANJAWALA, V.M.TARKUNDE

Headnote:APPEAL AGAINST DEMOLITION OF SHOPS BY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES—PROCEDURE AS LAID DOWN IN THE CODE NEED NOT BE FOLLOWED BUT DISTRICT JUDGE MAY ALLOW ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

       -in the case of Tarlok Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Amritsar, AIR 1986 SC 1957, the Supreme Court held that, what the High Court said, appears to be proper as it stated in the impugned judgment that if the District Judge so feels, he may allow any additional evidence to be led under this Rule. In appropriate cases whenever the District Judge feels satisfied he may give an opportunity to the parties to lead evidence as it will be open to the District Judge to apply the procedure as far as it can be made applicable in the facts and circumstances of each case.

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:

  • The appeal concerns the procedure to be followed in proceedings before the District Judge under the relevant municipal law, specifically regarding appeals against demolition orders issued by municipal authorities (!) (!) .
  • The core legal question is whether the procedure of a civil suit, as outlined in the Civil Procedure Code, must be strictly followed in such proceedings, or whether the phrase "as far as it can be made applicable" indicates flexibility in procedural requirements (!) (!) (!) .
  • The relevant statutory provision states that the procedure provided in the Civil Procedure Code shall be followed "as far as it can be made applicable" in applications, appeals, or references made to the District Judge under the municipal law (!) .
  • The Court interpreted this language to mean that while the procedure of a civil suit can guide these proceedings, it does not have to be followed in a strict, technical manner. Instead, the District Judge has discretion to apply the procedure to the extent it is appropriate to the circumstances of each case (!) (!) .
  • The Court emphasized that the proceedings under this law, including appeals, are essentially continuations of civil proceedings, and the procedural flexibility is intended to prevent rigid adherence that may hinder justice (!) (!) .
  • It was held that the District Judge may allow additional evidence and adopt procedures similar to those in civil suits when suitable, but is not obliged to follow every procedural step strictly, such as filing a plaint or recording evidence in the traditional manner (!) (!) .
  • The High Court's view that the District Judge could consider allowing additional evidence under a specific rule was upheld, reinforcing the discretionary and flexible approach in such proceedings (!) (!) .
  • The appeal was dismissed, affirming that procedural flexibility is permissible and that strict adherence to civil suit procedures is not mandatory in these proceedings (!) .

Please let me know if you need a detailed analysis or specific legal advice based on this case.


JUDGMENT

OZA, J.:— Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 5548 of 1982 dated 17-12-1982.

3. The appellant is a shopkeeper occupying Shop No. 5 situated on the road along side the Railway Line, Golebagh site in the city of Amritsar. There are 56 other shops similarly situated which are occupied by other allottees like the petitioner. The premises in occupation of the petitioner and other shopkeepers are on licences given by the Railway since April 1981. After the sanction was given to Railway for construction of these shops some dispute arose and the Corporation chose to revoke the sanction and ultimately as a result of litigation the present petitioner and the other shopkeepers similarly situated were given a notice to show cause by the Municipal Corporation, Amritsar, under Section 269(1) of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976. This was a composite notice also under Section 270(1) of the said Act. The petitioner received this notice along with other shopkeepers in the first half of October 1981.

4. The petitioner and other shopkeepers submitted their replies to the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation and the Commissioner passed an Order directing the demolition of the shops on 9-11-1981. This order was served on the petitioner and all other shopkeepers. The petitioner being aggrieved by this order preferred an appeal before the District Judge under Section 269 sub-clause (2). In this appeal before the District Judge the District Judge rejected an application submitted by the petitioner for recording of evidence and it was against this order passed by the District Judge that the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court wherein the Division Bench of the High Court took a view that if the District Judge so feels the application for recording of evidence could be considered under Order 41 Rule 27.

5. The only question raised in this appeal is about the interpretation of Section 384. It was contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the language of Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, in this appeal before the District Judge the procedure of a civil suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be followed and on the basis of this provision it was contended that the District Judge was bound to follow the procedure of a civil suit thereby framing of issues and recording of evidence is necessary whereas the learned counsel for the respondent Municipal Corporation contended that the language of Section 384 only provides that in these proceedings before the District Judge the procedure of a civil suit as far as possible will be followed. It was, therefore, contended that the expression "civil suit" in Section 384 includes an appeal as an appeal is nothing but a continuation of proceedings of the civil suit and therefore the meaning of Section 384 could only be that in case of appeal the procedure of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure shall be followed.

6. Learned counsel for the parties also drew our attention to various facts and the manner in which the shops were initially allotted and the grievance that the Municipal Corporation had about the allotment of these shops to the particular persons. But in our opinion those are matters not relevant for the purpose of decision of this case. The only question that arises is as to whether in an appeal filed under Section 269 sub-clause (2) the procedure of a civil suit as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be followed in view of language of Section 384 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976. Section 384 reads as follows :-

"The procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in the disposal of applications, appeals or references that may be made to the Court of the District Judge under this Act or any bye law






Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top