Judgment

VENKATACHALIAH, J.:- In these petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, petitioners seek special leave to appeal from the judgment and order dated 10-9-1986 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition 2919 of 1985 and Misc. Petition No. 413 of 1985 respectively.

The appeals raise a short and interesting question whether stacks of "eucalyptus-wood" sold by the forest-department after separating the "Ballies" and "Poles" constitute and answer the description of Timber under entry 32A of Part II of Schedule II to the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (the Act). The High Court, rejecting the appellants contention that what was sold, being leftovers after the extraction of "Poles" and "Ballies" of Eucalyptus (Nilgiri) Trees, was merely fire-wood within the meaning of and attracting entry No. 12 of Part V of Schedule II of the Act, held that the goods were "Timber" under the said entry 32A. It was, accordingly, held that appellants were liable to pay sales tax at the rate of 16% ad valorem.

2. Special leave is granted in both the cases. The appeals are taken-up for final hearing, heard and disposed of by this common judgment. We have heard Shri G. L. Sanghi, Senior counsel and Shri A. K. Sanghi for the appellants and Shri T. C. Sharma for the respondents.

3. Though, the notifications inviting tenders and certain other documents appear to describe the goods variously as "eucalyptus fire-wood stacks", "eucalyptus-wood stacks", Nilgiri fuel wood etc., the nomenclature is not determinative or conclusive of the nature of the "goods" which will have to be determined by the application of certain well-settled principles, guiding the matter.

Three entries as they then stood in the Schedule to the Act were pointed out by learned counsel as the possible alternatives :

Schedule II

Part II

Entry 32A : Timber .... 16%

Part V

Entry 12 : Fire-wood and charcoal ... 3%

Part VI

Entry 1 : All other goods not included in Schedule I or any other part of the Schedule .... 10%

Appellants contention urged before the High Court - and reiterated before us - was that what was sold were the leftovers and remnant of eucalyptus trees after the extraction of the substantial timber in the form of "Poles" and "Ballies" and that even on the basis of what the forest-department itself described the goods to be while putting the goods to tender, the goods were fire-wood heaps. It was urged that having regard to the well-known concept of what constitutes Timber the wood-stacks sold could, by no stretch of imagination, be held to answer the description of Timber. The wood sold, was, it was said, "fire-wood" or at all events, plain wood not amounting to Timber or fire-wood in which case the goods fall within the residuary- entry. This contention did not find favour with the High Court.

4. In a taxing statute words which are not technical expressions or words of art, but are words of everyday use, must be understood and given a meaning, not in their technical or scientific sense, but in a sense as understood in common parlance i.e. "that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it". Such words must be understood in their popular sense. The particular terms used by the legislature in the denomination of articles are to be understood according to the common, commercial understanding of those terms used and not in their scientific and technical sense "for the legislature does not suppose our merchants to be naturalists or geologists or botanists".

The expression Timber, it seems to us, has an accepted and well-recognised legal connotation and is nomen juris. It has also a popular meaning as a word of everyday use. In this case, the two meanings of Timber the legal and the popular, coalesce and are broadly subsumed in each other.

In Honywood v. Honywood, (1874) LR 18 Eq 306 at p. 309 Sir George Jessel referred to what distinguishes and is "Timber" :

"The question of what timber is depend