SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1989 Supreme(SC) 84

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.H. KANIA AND L.M. SHARMA, JJ.
GHANSHYAM DAS GUPTA
Versus
DEVI LAL AND OTHERS
Civil Appeal No. 2984 of 1983 {From the Judgment and Order dated May 19, 1982 of the High Court of Patna in Appellate Decree No. 275 of 1981}, decided on February 8, 1989
Advocates appeared :
Gobinda Mukhoty, Senior Advocate (K.N. Rai, Advocate, with him) for the Appellant;
F.S. Nariman, Senior Advocate (Ranjit Kumar, Advocate, with him) for the Respondents.

Headnote:

Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947 – Section 11 and 13 – Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 – Section 9 – legitimately - Decreed - Cantonment -Building in question is in Danapur Cantonment area near town of Patna appellant was inducted as a tenant owner one Janki Devi under a document of lease for a fixed period deed was not executed in accordance with requirements of law it remained inoperative – After period was over, Janki Devi instituted a suit eviction of appellant and for a decree for arrears of rent for period which was registered as Title Suit Bihar Rent Act was not then applicable to Danapur Cantonment pendency of case provisions of Bihar Rent Act were extended to this area Presumably in view of fact that lease deed could not be treated to be valid in eye of law – Held, Appellant also defaulted in payment of rent for period of five months, after the Act was applied to the Cantonment area, and impugned decree should not be disturbed – On behalf of appellant it was suggested that finding in judgment of the first appellate court it should be presumed that respondents case of default for subsequent period was rejected been taken through judgments of first appellate court and High Court and we find that controversy with respect to alleged default for the later period has been left undetermined – Question is dependent on an appraisal of evidence led by parties case should be remitted to first appellate court for the decision on the question whether the plaintiff-landlord has proved defendant-tenants default in payment of rent for period – Appeal is allowed.

Judgment

SHARMA, J.-The question which arises in this appeal by special leave is whether the default by a tenant in payment of rent for the period before the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Bihar Rent Act), was extended and became applicable, can be the basis for holding him a defaulter within the meaning of clause (d) of Section 11(1) of the Bihar Rent Act, 1947 and, therefore, liable to be evicted.

2. The building in question is in Danapur Cantonment area near the town of Patna. The appellant was inducted as a tenant therein by the owner one Janki Devi under a document of lease for a fixed period. Since the deed was not executed in accordance with the requirements of law it remained inoperative. After the period was over, Janki Devi instituted a suit on December 10, 1968 for eviction of the appellant and for a decree for arrears of rent for the period May to August 1968, which was registered as Title Suit No. 317 of 1968. The Bihar Rent Act was not then applicable to Danapur Cantonment. During the pendency of the case on February 14, 1970 the provisions of the Bihar Rent Act were extended to this area. Presumably in view of the fact that the lease deed could not be treated to be valid in the eye of law, a prayer for withdrawal of the relief for eviction was made by the plaintiff and was allowed with leave to file a fresh suit. A decree for arrears of rent, however, was passed.

3. The present suit was filed on May 28, 1974 for eviction of the appellant on the grounds of bona fide personal necessity and default in payment of rent for the periods May to July, October and November 1968, December 1969 to February 1970, and December 1973 to April 1974. The trial court decreed the suit on both the grounds. On appeal by the appellant, the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the finding on the question of bona fide personal necessity but affirmed the decree on the ground of default. The High Court has by the impugned judgment maintained the decree.

4. The appellant denied the allegation that he has defaulted in payment of rent. The first appellate court on a consideration of the evidence held that the appellant did default in payment of rent for May, June, July, October and November 1968, and December 1969 to February 1970, and on that basis decreed the suit. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that non-payment of rent for the period before February 14, 1970 (when the Bihar Rent Act was not applicable to the Cantonment area) is not relevant, and since the rent of less than a month in February 1970 remained unpaid after the Bihar Rent Act was extended, it could not be legitimately made the basis for the decree of eviction. The High Court agreed with the appellant that the Bihar Rent Act did not apply to the Cantonment area with retrospective effect, but proceeding further it said that in view of the decision in Kapur Chand Jain v. B.S. Grewal{(1965) 2 SCR 36 : AIR 1965 SC 1491} it must be held that the Act, although prospective in its application, takes into account the default in payment of rent of the earlier period.

5. There is no manner of doubt that the Act was applied to the area concerned on February 14, 1970 with prospective effect. The question whether the legislature intended to include previous default of the tenant in payment of rent within the grounds for eviction has to be answered by construing the language of the relevant provisions in the Bihar Rent Act. Although in Kapur Chand case{(1965) 2 SCR 36} a similar dispute was raised, it is not permissible to apply the decision irrespective of the difference in language of the two statutes. It is true that Section 9 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Punjab Act) which was relevant in the reported case also dealt with the grounds for eviction of a tenant, but there was clear indication in the section that the grounds for eviction included the earlier default also. The r



















Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top