JUDGMENT

FATHIMA BEEVI, J.:- By the impugned order dated the 18th May, 1989 the Designated Court, Pune, directed the respondent to be released on bail. The respondent was accused of having committed offence under Section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) besides the offences punishable under Sections 148, 149, 120-B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. The respondent was the member of the Shiv Sena Party and the Chief of the Thane District Unit. In consequence of the defeat of the party in Mayoral election held on 20th March, 1989 the party felt that the there was cross-voting and there were traitors among them. There had been a declaration by the respondent that such traitors would not be spared. The respondent was arrested in connection with the murder of one of the Corporators Shridhar Khopkar on 21-4-1989 on registering Crime No. 1348/89.

3. In releasing the respondent on bail while investigation was pending, the Designated Court appears to have been influenced by the fact that respondent was the leader of Political Party. The court assumed that as a leader, he would not be involved in such crimes and that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent is not guilty of any offence under the Act.

4. Having heard both the sides, we feel that the whole approach by the learned Judge was misconceived and the order is unsustainable. We have been taken through the entire proceedings. We find that the learned Judge has not noticed the relevant provisions of the Act which restrict the powers of the Court in granting bail. The learned Judge had also refused to consider the materials placed before it for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has committed the offence. In the course of the investigation witnesses have been questioned and their statements have been reduced to writing. The learned Judge refused to consider the statements recorded in the course of the investigation for the simple reason that such statements had not been read out in open Court though the Court was empowered to peruse the case diary for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the stage of investigation and the nature of the evidence that had been collected.

5. Sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the Act clearly provides that unless the Court is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent is not involved in disruptive activities, bail shall ordinarily be refused. Even under the provisions of Sections 437 and 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the powers of the Sessions Judge are not unfettered. The salient principles in granting bail .in grave crimes have not been taken note of.

6. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the lower court in granting or refusing bail but in cases where bail has been granted on irrelevant considerations, such as the status or influence of the person accused and regardless of the nature of the accusation and relevancy of materials on record, this court would not hesitate to interfere for the ends of justice.

7. There are no hard and fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court. Where the offence is of serious nature the Court has to decide the question of grant of bail in the light of such considerations as the nature and seriousness of offence, character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of presence of the accused not being secured at the trial and the reasonable apprehension of witness being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or such other similar considerations.

8. In the present case the learned Judge observed that it is a case of respectable person of a big political organisation, his freedom can