Judgment

SHARMA, J.:- This appeal is directed against the decree of the Madhya Pradesh High Court for eviction of the appellant from a house after holding him to be the respondents tenant. The appellant denied the title of the plaintiffs and their case that he has been in possession of the property as their tenant. The trial Court accepted the plaintiffs case and passed a decree in their favour, which was set aside on appeal by the first appellate Court. The decision was reversed by the High Court in second appeal by the impugned judgment.

2. Admittedly the house which was in the possession of the defendants father Misri Lal as a tenant belonged to one Smt. Raj Rani who sold the same on 11-8-1952 to the plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, Navinchand Dalchand. In 1959 a suit for his eviction was filed by Navinchand, which was resisted on the ground that Smt. Raj Rani had earlier transferred the house to a trust and she, therefore, could not later convey any title to Navinchand. The trial Court rejected the defence and passed a decree against which Misri Lal filed an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal the parties resolved their dispute amicably. Misri Lal accepted the title of Navinchand and a deed, Ext. P-20, creating a fresh lease in favour of Misri Lal under Navinchand as lessor, was executed with effect from 1-12-1962. The appeal was disposed of by recording this fact and stating further that the arrears of rent had been paid off. The compromise petition and the decree have been marked in the present suit as Ext. P-21 and Ext. P-22. Misri Lal continued to occupy the house till he died in 1972 leaving behind his son, the present appellant, as his heir and legal representative. Navinchand sold the suit property to the plaintiff-respondents on 4-1-1973, who sent a notice to the appellant on 14-3-1973. Since the appellant refused to recognise them as owners of the house, another notice terminating the tenancy was served in January 1974 and the present suit was filed in June of the same year.

3. The appellant resisted the claim in the plaint on the same old plea which his father Misri Lal had unsuccessfully taken in the earlier suit, namely, that Smt. Raj Rani having transferred the disputed house to a trust in 1936 was not competent to re-transfer it to Navinchand Dalchand, the vendor of the plaintiffs-respondents. The trial Court disbelieved the defence version holding that although Smt. Raj Rani had executed a trust deed in 1936, but the same was not acted upon and the trust does not appear to have come into existence. On appeal the first appellate Court reversed the finding and further held that the defendant could not be estopped from challenging the title of the plaintiffs.

4. It has been the case of the appellant that the consent of Misri Lal to the compromise in the earlier suit was obtained by force, but the plea was not substantiated by any evidence, and it has been pointed out by the High Court that the appellant admitted in his deposition that to his knowledge no force had been used against Misri Lal. The High Court further rightly rejected the argument that the decree, Ext. P-22, would not bind the parties since it was founded on a compromise and not on an adjudication by the Court on the question of title. The Court also observed that the statements made in the compromise petition, Ext. P-21, in the earlier suit support the case of the plaintiffs independently of the compromise decree, and further, the defence plea has to be rejected in view of the deed, Ext. P-20, creating a fresh lease. These findings were sufficient for the disposal of the appeal but the High Court proceeded to consider the question whether Smt. Raj Rani had in fact transferred the suit house in favour of a trust, and decided the issue against the appellant.

5. The grievance of Mr. Rohatagi, the learned counsel for the appellant, that in view of the limited scope of a second appeal under S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court wa