JUDGMENT

THOMMEN, J.:—Special Leave is granted.

2. This appeal by the Union of India. arises from the judgment dated 7-12-1988 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 1060 of 1987 (Reported in (1990) 40 Delhi LT 179) setting aside orders dated 22-10-1986 and 4-31987. The former order was made by a Bench of two members of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called theTribunal) and the latter order was made by the President of Tribunal. By their Order dated 22-10-1986, the Bench of two members of the Tribunal stated that they doubted the-correctness of an earlier decision of a Bench of three members of the Tribunal in Bakelite Hylam Ltd., Bombay v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (1986) 25 ELT 240 and directed that the case of the present respondent, Paras Laminates (P) Ltd., be placed before the President of the Tribunal for referring it to a larger Bench of the Tribunal. The President by his Order dated 4-3-1987 referred the case to a larger Bench of five members. These two orders were struck down by the High Court stating that the Bench of two members ought to have followed the earlier decision of the larger Bench of 3 Judges (members?) and a reference of the case to a still larger Bench was contrary to judicial precedent and judicial discipline.

3. In Bakelite Hylam (Supra) a Bench of three members had held that the goods in question fell under Tariff Item 84.60 as claimed by the importer in the Bills of Entry. In the present case, the importer claimed in its Bills of Entry that the goods imported by it fell under Tariff Item 84.60. But the Customs authorities rejected the contention of the importer and classified the goods under Tariff Item 73.15(2).. The importer appealed to the Collector of Customs, but without success. in its second appeal before the Bench of two members, the importer relied upon the earlier decision in Bakelite Hylam (Supra) and contended that an identical classification ought to have been adopted by the Customs authorities for identical goods. The Bench of two members, however, referred the case to the President of the Tribunal for referring the same to a larger Bench. The order of the Bench of two members and that of the President have been struck down by the High Court by the impugned judgment for the reasons stated above.

4. Mr, V. Gauri Shanker, appearing for the appellant Union of India, submits that S. 129-C of the Customs Act, 1962 contains express provisions enabling the President of the Tribunal to constitute larger Benches to resolve conflicts in opinion arising between members of a Bench or between Benches of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has ample powers to regulate its own procedure, apart from the express provisions of the statute in that behalf. Counsel contends that the Tribunal has inherent or incidental or ancillary powers to effectuate the statutory powers expressly granted to it. Counsel submits that the statute must be so construed as to make the conferment of power efficacious and meaningful. To deny the power of a Bench of two members to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision and to refer the case to the President for being heard by a larger Bench is to fetter the jurisdiction expressly vested in the Tribunal and thus stifle the growth of law evolving from the decisions of the Tribunal exercising judicial powers like a Court, albeit within the statutory limits of its Jurisdiction.

5. Mr. G. L. Sanghi, appearing for the respondent (the importer) submits that the Tribunal is a creature of the statute. Its jurisdiction is limited to the specific powers conferred by the statute. It has no inherent jurisdiction and its powers are not plenary and are limited to the express provisions contained in the statute. While the powers of a civil court are plenary and unlimited unless expressly curtailed by statute, the powers of a tribunal are the result of express grant and cannot exceed the bounds limited 6y the constituting statute. In the present case the po