JUDGMENT

SHARMA, J.—Special leave is granted. The appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court setting aside the decree passed by the trial Court and the first appellate Court in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants, and dismissing their suit, on the ground of being barred by limitation.

2. The subject-matter of the present case is agricultural land in Himachal Pradesh belonging to one Sham Sunder, the original plaintiff since dead, who was the father of the appellant No. 1 and the grandfather of the appellants Nos. 2 and 3. The defendant respondent, Moti, alleging to be a sub-tenant cultivating the land, claimed the benefits u/ S. 27(4) of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Notice was issued to Sham Sunder which according to his case was not served on him. The claim of Moti was accepted, amount of compensation payable u/ S. 27(4) of the Act was determined by the Compensation Officer and consequential orders were passed in his favour. The present slit was filed by Sham Sunder challenging the aforesaid orders on the allegation that Moti was merely a labourer employed by him and he never cultivated the disputed land and he, therefore, was not entitled to the acquisition of the proprietary right u/ S. 27(4) of the Act. The suit was resisted by the defendant. Both the trial Court and the appellate Court, accepted the plaintiffs case and concurrently held that Moti was not a sub-tenant and hence, the order passed by the Revenue Officer in his favour u/ S. 27(4) of the Act was without jurisdiction. The plea of limitation was rejected and the suit was decreed holding that Sham Sunder being the tenant in possession was entitled to the right u /S. 27(4) of the Act.

3. In a further appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendant contended before the High Court that the suit having been filed after a period of more than three years from the day of the order u/ S. 27(4) of the Act was barred by limitation. The Court agreed with him and dismissed the suit by the impugned judgment. The High Court did not deal with any other aspect in the case, stating that the defendant had not urged any other point in support of the second appeal.

4. In the impugned judgment the High Court has held that "as a consequence of the order of the Compensation Officer under Section 27(4), the title in the land stood vested in the appellant", and merely because a longer period of limitation is provided for recovery of possession under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the suit cannot be said to be within the period of limitation. Accordingly either one year period under Article 100 or in the alternative the three years rule under Article 113 has been held applicable. We do not think that the High Court is right.

5. The principle for deciding the question of limitation in a suit filed after an adverse order under a Special Act is well settled. If the order impugned in the suit is such that it has to be set aside before any relief can be granted to the plaintiff the provisions of Article 100 will be attracted and if no particular Article of the Limitation Act is applicable the suit must be governed by the residuary Article 113, prescribing a period of three years. Therefore, in a suit for title to an immovable property which has been the subject-matter of a proceeding under a Special Act if an adverse order comes in the way of the success of the plaintiff, he must get it clearer before proceeding further. On the other hand if the order has been passed jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, non existent in the eye of law and it is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be covered by Article 65. In the present case the controversial facts have been decided in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and the findings were not challenged before the High Court. The position, thus, is that the plaintiff was the owner in cultivating pos