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1991 Supreme(SC) 629

Supreme court of india
KULDIP SINGH AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.
State of Orissa, Appellant
Versus
K. Rajeshwar Rao, Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 323 of 1980, D/-14-11-1991.

Advocates:
R.K.MEHTA, S.G.SAMBANDHAN

Headnote:Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - Sections 7/16, 20 - Sample of Cumin (lira) Sale by son of owner - Found adulterated Even then acquitted on the ground that his father was owner and had that fact been brought to the notice of the sanctioning authority u/s. 20 of the Act, it would not have permitted to execute the respondent, the son of the owner- Whether correct? (No) (Para 5) - Acquittal reversed - Whether be sentenced to imprisonment - Incident prior to 1976 amendment - Only fine imposed. (Para 6)

       Held: The Act is a welfare legislation to prevent health hazards by consuming adulterated food. The mens rea is not an essential ingredient. It is a social evil and the Act prohibits commission of the offences under the Act. The essential ingredient is sale to the purchaser by the vendor. It is not material to establish the capacity of the person vis-a-vis the owner of the shop to prove his authority to sell the adulterated food exposed for sale in the shop. It is enough for the prosecution to establish that the person who sold the adulterated article of food had sold it to the purchaser (including the Food Inspector) and that Food Inspector purchased the same in strict compliance with the provisions of the Act. As stated earlier the sanctioning authority has to consider the material placed before it whether the offence of adulteration of food was committed and punishable under the Act, Once that satisfaction is reached and the authority- is competent to grant the sanction, the sanction is valid. It is not necessary for the sanctioning authority to consider that the person (who) sold is the owner, servant, agent or partner or relative of the owner or was duly authorised in this behalf. (Para 5)

       Further held: We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the courts below committed manifest error of law causing miscarriage of justice in holding that the sanctioning authority must be apprised of the status of the person that sold the adulterated food article to the Food Inspector or the purchaser. Consequently, the acquittal is set aside and the respondent is held liable to be conviction and accordingly convicted under s. 16(1)(a)(i) read with s. 7(1) of the Act. But what is the sentence to be imposed? The offence had occurred on March 13, 1976 before the Amending Act has come into force. Under the unamended Act it was not mandatory to impose the minimum sentence. For reasons to be recorded the Magistrate may impose the sentence, fine or both for the first offence and it was mandatory to impose minimum sentence for second or subsequent offences. As stated, 15 years have passed by from the date of the offence and at this distance of time the ends of justice may not serve to send the respondent to imprisonment. Suffice that he has undergone, all these years, the agony of the prosecution. But, however, the sentence of fine of a sum of Rs. 500/- is imposed upon the respondent and he shall pay the same. In default he shall undergo the imprisonment for a period of one month. The appeal is accordingly allowed. (Para 6)

Judgment

K. RAMASWAMY, J:- The respondent was found to have sold adulterated cumin (Jira) on March 13, 1976 punishable under S. 16(1)(a)(i) read with S. 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 1954, for short the Act. Both the Courts found as a fact that the adulterated cumin was exposed for sale and PW-1, the Food Inspector, purchased the cumin (Jira) under the provisions of the Act and on analysis by the Public Analyst it was found that it contained 9% foreign seeds as against permissible 7.0%; inorganic (dust, stones, lumps of earth etc.) at 0.2% and organic (chaff, stem, stipules, etc.) at 1.8%. Accordingly it was found to have been adulterated. The Magistrate and the High Court acquitted the respondent on the sole ground that his father Appa Rao was the owner of the shop. Had that fact been brought to the notice of the sanctioning authority under S. 20 of the Act, it would not have permitted to prosecute the respondent, the son of the owner. Accordingly placing reliance on Jagannath Sahu v. Food Inspector, Jaipur Municipality, (1973) 2 Cut WR 1556, acquitted the accused and was confirmed by the High Court.

2. The sole question that emerges for consideration is whether it is necessary that the respondent should be the owner of the shop for being prosecuted for the offences under S. 16(1)(a)(i) read with S. 7(1) of the act. Sub-section (1) of S. 20 of the Act reads thus:

"(1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority."

Proviso is not necessary. Hence omitted.

Section 2 of the Act defines adulterated that if the articles sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser, who is to purchase, the article is adulterated. If the quality or variety of the articles fall below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability is also adulterated. It would, therefore, be clear that the word adulterated was used widely. If the food or article of food is adulterated, if it is not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser and sold by the seller and is to his prejudice, or contains any foreign substance in excess of its prescribed limit, so as to affect injuriously, the nature, substance or quality thereof. In view of the finding of the Courts below that cumin (Jira) was adulterated it is a sale by the vendor to the purchaser in terms of the provisions of the Act. What S. 20 envisages is that no prosecution for an offence under the Act should be instituted except by or by the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person otherwise authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority. therefore, grant of sanction to prosecute for an offence under the Act is a condition precedent. The relevant criteria under S. 20(1) is the competence of the officer to grant the sanction for the offence. It does not postulate whether the person sold should be the owner or a servant or a person on behalf of the owner (son of the owner). Section 7 prohibits manufacture, sale of certain, articles of food. No person shall himself or any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store or sell or distribute (i) any adulterated food etc. The phrase "himself or any person on his behalf obviously included any other person like servant, son, father, or agent irrespective of the relationship legal or jural etc. The person so sold during the course of business either the owner or the person that sold the adulterated food or article of food or both are liable to prosecution.

3. It is not in dispute that the officer that granted the sanction in this c





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