JUDGMENT

KULDIP SINGH, J.:— The short question for consideration is whether the New Delhi Municipal Committee (the Committee) was justified in declaring the verandah in front of the shop, owned by the appellant, in the Connaught Circus, New Delhi as "public street" under Section 171(4) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (the Act). The trial court answered the question in the affirmative and dismissed the suit filed by the appellant plaintiff. The appeal against the said order was dismissed by the Senior Subordinate Judge on February 13, 1967. The second appeal was also dismissed by a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court. Finally, the letters patent appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on March 12, 1982 (reported in AIR 1982 Delhi 319). This appeal by way of special leave is against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court.

2. The appellant-plaintiff obtained a perpetual lease, dated February 20, 1940, from the Governor - General in Council, in respect of plot No. 2, in block H, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The appellant constructed the building in accordance with the sanctioned plan. The building has a verandah in front of it measuring 95.33 x 17 feet. The verandah adjoins the verandahs of other shops in the Connaught Circus thereby making a continuous passage for the convenience of the customers. These verandahs have always been used for passing and re-passing by the members of the public. The appellant claims that the verandah, being its private property, could not be declared a "public street" under the Act. In any case the appellant cannot be deprived of its property without payment of compensation.

3. Section 171 of the Act was extended to the New Delhi area by the notification dated July 31, 1958. The Committee by a Resolution dated July 18, 1959, decided, in the public interest and public safety, to declare all the verandahs in front of the shops in Connaught Place and Connaught Circus as "public streets" under the Act. Thereafter, by another Resolution dated September 30, 1958, the Committee resolved to follow the procedure under Section 171(4) of the Act and that the verandahs be declared as "public streets". The appellant challenged the action of the Committee by way of civil suit. As mentioned above, the appellant has lost from a the courts below.

4. The action of the Committee was challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court on the following grounds: -

1. Section 171(4) of the Act was confiscatory and, as such, violative of Art. 31 of the Constitution of India as it stood before the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.

2. That the verandah in dispute was not a "street" as defined under Section 3(13)(a) of the Act. According to the appellant only a "street" can be declared a "public street" under the Act. The verandah being a private property of the appellant it could neither be treated as a "street" nor declared as "public street" under the Act.

3. That the mandatory notice as required under S. 171(4) of the Act was not affixed in the "street" and, as such, the impugned resolution was passed without following the procedure laid down under the law.

5. While dealing with the first point, the High Court proceeded on the assumption that the appellant was deprived of its property and also that the appellant could invoke the protection of Art. 31 of the Constitution of India as the said article was in Part III of the Constitution at the relevant time. The High Court, however, came to the conclusion that the Act was an "existing law" under Art. 31 (5)(a) of the Constitution and as such was immune from the attack on the ground of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, therefore, rejected the argument on the following reasoning (AIR 1982 Delhi 319, para 29) : -

"We, therefore, hold that S. 171(4) even if it amounts to a deprivation of property of the plaintiffs is an existing law and is, therefore, saved from the attack of unconsti