JUDGMENT

PUNCHHI, J.:—This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, dated August 7, 1979, passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 4206 of 1973, raising an important question of law, whether Ss. 110 and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are inter se independent, distinct and exclusive or are they inter-woven, inter-connected and inter-playing, on the answer of which depends the survival or otherwise of proceedings for confiscation of goods and imposition of penalties, under Chapter XIV of the Act.

2. On March 4, 1970, Harbans Lal, the appellant herein, was arrested and a huge quantity of gold, currency notes and other articles were seized from his possession. The seizure was effected under Chapter XIII of the Act. Sub-sec. (2) of S. I 10 occurring in that Chapter provides that where any goods are seized under sub-sec. (1) of S. 110 and if no notice in respect thereof is given under Cl. (a) of S. 124 within six months of the seizure of the goods, the goods shall be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized; provided that the period of six months may, on sufficient cause being shown, be extended by the Collector of Customs for a period not exceeding another six months. On August 27, 1970, prior to the expiry of six months from the date of seizure, the Collector, Central Excise and Customs, Chandigarh, on his own, by means of an ex parte order, extended the seizure period further by six months, i.e., up to 19-3-71. Thereafter, on March 4, 1971, a show cause notice is issued to the appellant in accordance with the provisions of S. 124 of the Act informing him the grounds on which it was proposed to confiscate the goods and to impose on him a penalty, as well as affording him an opportunity for making representation in writing within a period of ten days against the grounds of confiscation or imposition of penalty mentioned in the notice. Opportunity was also given to the appellant in the said notice for his personal appearance or through a legal representative on the date to be fixed, on which date the case would be decided on the basis of the evidence on record.

3. The appellant, in response, challenged the jurisdiction of the Collector, inter alia, claiming that since the extension of the seizure period under S. 110 of the Act had been made ex parte, without affording the appellant an opportunity of being heard against the proposed extension, the entire proceedings were vitiated and hence issuance of notice under S. 124 was void ab initio. The Collector, however, deferred the objection raised by the petitioner viewing that it would be dealt with during the course of proceedings under S. 124 of the Act. Thus at that stage itself the appellant approached the High Court in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for quashing the extension order and sequally the show cause .notice, and in the alternative, for a direction to the Collector to decide the preliminary objection as to the vitiation first and not to proceed with the case under S. 124 of the Act, its initiation being void ab initio.

4. The legal stance adopted by the appellant was refuted by the Customs Authorities. The factual position was, however, not denied. Additionally it was pleaded that proceedings under S. 78 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 had also been initiated against the appellant within the period of limitation prescribed under S. 79 of the said Act. The seizure of goods thenceforth was suggested to be under the Gold (Control) Act, and thus it was pleaded that S. 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 was no longer in play for the purpose of holding the goods by the Customs authorities. On the legal question, it was asserted that the provisions of Ss. 110 and 124 were mutually exclusive; the former only compelling the return of goods to the person from whose possession they were taken, on the expiry of the original or extende