JUDGMENT

N. P. SINGH, J.:—The defendant in a suit for eviction is the appellant before this Court. The suit plot was let out to the appellant as a monthly tenant for an automobile garage, The plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as "the respondent") issued a notice on 10-7-1975 determining the lease in favour of the appellant with effect from 31-7-1975. Later the suit in question was filed. As the suit premises had not been let out for residential purposes, it was an admitted position that the Central Provinces and Berar Letting Of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 was not applicable.

2. The Trial Court dismissed the said suit on a finding that as the appellant was using the suit premises for manufacturing purposes, a six months notice was required before the lease could be determined and as the notice issued to the appellant under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred as "the Act") had purported to determine the tenancy with 15 days. notice, the suit in question could not have been filed. On appeal being filed on behalf of the respondent, the Assistant Judge came to the conclusion that the premises in question had not been let out for any manufacturing purpose but for a motor workshop and as such the notice under S. 106 of the Act was valid and the respondent was entitled to the possession of the plot in dispute. The second appeal filed on behalf of the appellant was dismissed in limine by the High Court saying that no substantial question of law was involved.

3. Before this Court the finding recorded by the court of appeal below and affirmed by the High Court that the respondent was entitled to a decree for possession and the appellant was liable to be evicted was not questioned. A new stand was taken on behalf of the appellant, that in view of the subsequent events the aforesaid decree of eviction passed against the appellant cannot be given effect to. It was pointed out that by C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control (Second Amendment) Order, 1989 a new clause 13A has been introduced in the said Order. The new clause 13A is as follows:

"13-A. No decree for eviction shall be passed in a suit or proceeding filed and pending against the tenant in any court or before any Authority unless the landlord produces a written permission of the Controller as required by sub-clause (1) of clause 13."

4. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on I st August, 1983 and clause 13A has been introduced in the year 1989 during the pendency of the present appeal. By that very amending Order the definition of "premises" given in the original Order has also been amended and the said definition after amendment includes not only building but even "land not being used for agricultural purposes". If the definition of the "premises", which has been amended, had been in force on the date of the filing of the suit, then the respondent had to pursue the procedure prescribed for eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Order aforesaid instead of filing a suit after service of notice under S. 106 of the Act. There is no dispute that the amendment has not been introduced with retrospective effect and it is only prospective in nature. As the suit premises is only land and not a building when the suit was filed steps for eviction of the appellant could not have been taken in accordance with the provisions of the Order aforesaid because then those provisions were not applicable.

5. But the stand of the appellant is that although clause 13A has been introduced not with retrospective effect still it shall be applicable to proceedings pending before any Court including this Court and in view of the bar imposed by said clause 13A, no decree for eviction can be passed by this Court in the present appeal against the appellant unless the respondent-landlord produces a written permission of the Controller as required by sub-clause (1) of clause 13 of the Order. Reliance was placed on the case of H. Shiva Rao v. Cecil