1. Appeal against conviction for murder under Section 302, IPC — stabbing of step-mother — reliance on eye-witness testimony and dying declaration. (Para 2 , 5 )
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1993 Supreme(SC) 556
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY AND G. N. RAY, JJ.
Rajangam, Appellant
Versus
State of T.N., Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 336 of 1983
Decided on 13-7-1993.
Important Points
The court held that where a single injury is inflicted without clear intent to cause death, but with knowledge that it is likely to cause death, the offense is culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, rather than murder under Section 302 IPC.
Subject
Criminal Law - Murder
Act Referred
Headnote
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, sec. 379 and sec. 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act - trial court acquitting the accused of the charge u/s 302 for causing death to the deceased after rejecting the evidence of eye witness and attaching no importance to dying declaration - High Court, on appeal convicting the appellant u/s 302 I.P.C. - accused giving one stabbing blow on abdoment and causing knee Injury - deceased dying after 8 days of operation - circumstances show that the accused could not have intended to cause death of the deceased by inflicting injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of the nature to cause death - Conviction u/s 302 set aside and convicted u/s 304 part II and sentenced to R.I. for 5 years.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the trial court's acquittal when two reasonable views of the evidence were possible. (Para 3 )
3. The trial court's rejection of eye-witnesses was perverse; the evidence and dying declaration established the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 8 )
4. Inflicting a single injury with knowledge that it is likely to cause death, without intent to kill, constitutes an offence under Section 304 Part II, IPC. (Para 9 )
5. Conviction under Section 302, IPC set aside; appellant convicted under Section 304 Part II, IPC and sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment. (Para 9 )
6. When can an appellate court reverse a trial court's order of acquittal based on eye-witness testimony?
An appellate court may reverse an acquittal if the trial court's view in rejecting eye-witness evidence is found to be perverse and unreasonable, particularly when other evidence, such as a dying declaration, supports the prosecution's case. (Para 8 )
7. What distinguishes murder under Section 302 from culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II, IPC in cases of stabbing?
If the accused inflicts a single injury without the intent to cause death, but with the knowledge that such an injury is likely to cause death, the offence is classified under Section 304 Part II, IPC. (Para 9 )
JUDGMENT
Delay condoned.
2. This is an appeal under Section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 2 of the SC (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act. The sole applicant was tried for an offence punishable under Section 302, I.P.C. for causing the death of one Karuthammal, the deceased, by cutting her with a knife on her abdomen and left knee on 22-6-78 at about 9.30 p.m. as a result of which the deceased died in the Erskine Hospital, Madurai on 30-6-78. The case rested mainly on the evidence of P.Ws. I and 2, the eye-witnesses and other circumstantial evidence. The trial Court rejected the evidence of the eye-witnesses on the ground that they could not have been residing in the house in which the occurrence has taken place. In an appeal against the said acquittal the Division Bench of the High Court in an elaborate judgment considered the entire evidence on record and the reasons given by the trial Court in rejecting the same and reached the conclusion that the view taken by the trial Court is perverse and unreasonable and accordingly set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. Hence the present appeal.
3. Mr. M. S. Ganesh, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the Division Bench of the High Court has overlooked the fact that two views are possible in this case and erred in reversing the view taken by the trial Court which is also a reasonable one. In other words, the submission is that the prosecution has not established its case beyond all reasonable doubt and, therefore, the trial Court was right in acquitting the appellant.
4. To appreciate the submission, it becomes necessary for us to state few facts.
5. The deceased was the step-mother of the appellant and Muthukannu Thevar, husband of the deceased and father of the accused, was residing in a house in First Street, Ram Nagar, Marimedu, with Madurai City. The said Muthukannu Thevar, besides the above house, was also owning two other houses in this locality, a garden land in Perungame Vallur and other house site. His first wife was Meenakshi Animal. The accused and his elder brother Bose were born to Thevar through his first wife. Bose had married Saraswathi, the daughter of Mokkamayandi who is his maternal uncle. About six years prior to the occurrence, Bose died. Thereafter his wife Saraswathi went to her parents house and lived with them. After the death of his first wife, Muthukkannu Thevar married the deceased as his second wife. P. W. 1 is the daughter of the deceased and she was given in marraige to P.W. 2. After their marriage P.Ws. 1 and 2 had been living in Pykara which is adjacent to Madurai. About some days thereafter, the accused demanded the deceased for a partition and in that account there were some disputes. However, a partition took place and it is alleged that the accused was living a wayward life and squandered away his properties. Having married Saraswathi, he asked again a share in the house. The deceased refused to give the share demanded by the accused. On account of this, the accused began to stay in the house of P.W. 12 Subbiah adjacent to the house of the deceased where he was giving trouble to the deceased and a complaint was given by her. While matter stood thus, at about 9 p.m. on 22-6-78 after taking food, P.W. 1 and her husband P.W. 2 were sitting in the open terrace in the first floor, the moon was shining bright and the street lamps were also burning. P.Ws. 3 and 4 were sitting in the threshold of the house. Just then the accused came inside by passing through the doorway armed with the knife and stabbed the deceased on the abdomen and inflicted injury on the left knee.P.Ws. 1 and 2 shouted and the accused was seen brandishing the knife and threatening the people present there. On hearing the alarm raised by P.W. 1 and the deceased O.Ws. 3 and 4 came there and saw the accused running away. P.Ws. 1 and 3 kept
