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1992 Supreme(SC) 911

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, S.C. AGRAWAL AND A.S. ANAND, JJ.
Smt. Thakamma Mathew, Appellant
Versus
M. Azamathulla Khan and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 6076 of 1990
Decided on 15-12-1992

Advocates:
P.Mahale, P.R.RAMASESHESH.S.PARIHARHAR, SANTOSH HEGDE

Headnote:THIS SECTION PRECLUDES GRANT OF RELIEF OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT EXCEPT WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD - Power under Order 7, Rule 7, CPC conferred on the court does not enable it to override the statutory limitations contained in Section 16 - Suit for specific performance of contract – limitation – it would be open to the seller to show that it was barred by the provisions of Section 16 - POWERS CONFERRED UNDER THIS RULEDO NOT ENABLE COURT TO OVERRIDE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS UNDER SECTION 16 OF SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT AND SECTION 54 OF LIMITATION ACT

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:

  1. The case involves a dispute over an agreement to sell property, with issues concerning cancellation, possession, and specific performance of the contract (!) .

  2. The appellant had entered into an agreement to sell property and paid an advance, but the sale was not finalized within the stipulated period, leading to a notice of cancellation and forfeiture of the advance amount (!) (!) .

  3. The trial court held that the agreement was canceled due to the defendant's failure to perform within the agreed time, and it directed the refund of the advance amount along with damages, rejecting the defendant’s claim of part performance and improvements (!) .

  4. The appellate court affirmed that the time was not the essence of the contract and that the appellant was justified in terminating the agreement. It also ordered the defendant to pay the remaining consideration amount with interest and to execute the sale deed (!) .

  5. The High Court, however, dismissed the suit for specific performance, citing that the conditions under which such relief could be granted, especially under the relevant statutory provisions, were not satisfied. The court emphasized that the suit was barred by limitation and that the appellant had clearly indicated her intention to cancel the agreement, thereby precluding the grant of specific performance (!) (!) .

  6. The High Court also observed that the defendant had obtained possession of the property shortly after the agreement and claimed improvements, but the evidence was insufficient to establish possession in pursuance of the contract, which affected the applicability of the doctrine of part performance (!) (!) .

  7. The Court noted that the power to mould reliefs under procedural rules does not permit overriding statutory limitations, and thus the decree for deposit and sale execution was not sustainable (!) .

  8. The Court recognized the need to consider the cross appeal and the fact that the defendant had been in possession for a long period, during which he enjoyed the property without full payment, and directed interim compensation for use and occupation during the pending proceedings (!) (!) .

  9. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court’s judgment was set aside, with the matter remitted for reconsideration on the merits, ensuring that the case is disposed of expeditiously (!) .

  10. The appellant expressed willingness to settle the matter by offering a substantial sum, but the respondents declined, maintaining their stance (!) .

  11. The case underscores that a suit for specific performance must be filed within the statutory limitation period and that the conditions for granting such relief under the law must be strictly met. It also clarifies that procedural powers cannot override statutory restrictions (!) (!) .

  12. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant was awarded interim compensation for use and occupation of the property, which was to be paid regularly until final disposal (!) .

  13. The final direction emphasizes the importance of proper consideration of all appeals and cross appeals together and the need for a prompt resolution of such disputes (!) .

  14. Overall, the judgment highlights the importance of adhering to statutory limitations, the proper invocation of doctrines such as part performance, and the procedural constraints on courts in granting specific performance relief.


JUDGMENT

S. C. AGRAWAL, J.:—This appeal is directed against the judgment dated July 18, 1990 of the High Court of Karnataka in Regular First Appeal No. 154 of 1985. It arises out of O.S. 9213 of 1980 filed by the appellant against M. Azmathulla Khan (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) for cancellation of an agreement to sell dated November 12, 1974 and for recovery of possession of the premises bearing No. 102, Wheeler Road, Gooxe Town, Bangalore, the said property was purchased by the appellant from one D. Ponnurangam under a registered sale deed dated June 29, 1972, by the agreement dated November 12, 1974, the appellant agreed to sell the said property to the defendant for a sum of Rs.90,000/-. The defendant paid a sum of Rs. 3,000/- as advance on the date of execution of the said agreement and paid a further sum of Rupees 15,000/- on November 25, 1974. Under the agreement the last date for finalisation of the transaction was January 11, 1975. It appears that Smt. Mohanambal, one of the sisters of Pounnurangam, had not joined in execution of the sale deed dated June 29, 1972 in favour of the appellant. In the agreement dated November 12, 1974, it was provided that the said Smt. Mohanambal had disclaimed any interest in the property and that the appellant would make available a declaration to that effect before the finalisation of the sale transaction and would also give necessary indemnity bond of either herself or of her husband giving security for indemnifying the possible damages or loss to the defendant to the extent of Rs. 5,000/- and the interest thereon from the date of the sale deed at 12% per annum in case the said Smt. Mohanambal or anybody through her puts him to such loss or damage or deprives him out of the property to the extent of her share. The case of the appellant is that about a fortnight after the execution of the said agreement dated November 12, 1974, the defendant obtained possession of the property above mentioned on the ground that it was needed temporarily in connection with a marriage. On January 7, 1975, the defendant gave a notice to the appellant to which the appellant sent a reply dated January 9, 1975.

2. The transaction of sale was not finalised within the period of two months prescribed in the agreement. On March 10, 1975, the appellant sent a notice that since the sale had not been completed within the period prescribed, the agreement had been cancelled and the advance of Rs. 18,000/- had been forfeited. By the said notice the defendant was called upon to deliver possession of the suit premises and pending delivery of possession to pay damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month. Thereafter on March 18, 1975, the appellant filed the suit giving rise to this appeal for a declaration that agreement dated November 12, 1975 stands cancelled and for recovery of possession of the suit premises and for Rs. 1,870/- towards damages. In the said suit, the case of the appellant was that the time was essence of the contract and since the defendant had failed to perform his part of the contract, the agreement had been cancelled and the advance amount of Rs. 18,000/- had been forfeited. The said suit was resisted by the defendant who pleaded that he was ready to perform his part of the contract and the appellant had defaulted. The defendant also pleaded that he has obtained possession of the property in part performance of the contract and the appellant was not entitled to claim possession or damages. He claimed that he had spent nearly Rs. 20,000/- on improvements in suit premises. The defendant also pleaded that he was ready and willing to take a regular sale deed provided appellant complied with the terms of the agreement as regards Smt. Mohanambals share in the suit property.

3. The trial Court, i.e., tenth Additional City Civil Judge, Mayo Hall, Bangalore, by his judgment dated September 12, 1984, decreed that the agreement dated November 12, 1974 is cancelled and the app





















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