JUDGMENT

N. P. SINGH, J.:—These appeals have been filed against the orders passed by the High Court dismissing the writ applications, filed on behalf of the three appellants, questioning the validity of their reversion from the posts of Auditors to the posts of Lower Division Clerks.

2. Appellants, P. V. Srinivasa Sastry and ,M. Mahadeva Setty, had been appointed as Upper Division Clerks by process of direct recruitment in the year 1963. So far the appellant P. Gangireddy is concerned, he had been appointed initially as a Lower Division Clerk. They were working as Auditors in the year 1975. Departmental proceedings were initiated against them, for having withdrawn amounts in an illegal manner in connection with Leave Travel Concession. On 30th January, 1976, final orders were passed in the aforesaid proceedings, imposing the penalty of reduction in rank, by reverting them from the posts of Auditors to the posts of Lower Division Clerks.

3. Mr. Ganesh, the learned counsel appearing for appellants, submitted that the disciplinary proceedings, as well as the final orders of punishment against the appellants, have been vitiated, in view of the fact that the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated by Senior Deputy Accountant General instead of the Accountant General who was the appointing authority of the appellants. According to him, the whole exercise on the part of the respondents was violative of Art. 311 of the Constitution and the appellants have been deprived of the guarantee ensured to the holders of the civil posts under the State.

4. Article 31l(l) says that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an All-India service or a Civil service of a State or holds civil post under the Union or a State "shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed." Whether this guarantee includes within itself the guarantee that even the disciplinary proceeding should be initiated only by the appointing authority? It is well known that departmental proceeding consists of several stages; the initiation of the proceeding, the inquiry in respect of the charges levelled against that delinquent officer and the final order which is passed after the conclusion of the inquiry. Article 311 (1) guarantees that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. But Art. 31l(l) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, it is open to Union of India or a State Government to make any Rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority. Any such Rule shall not be inconsistent with Art. 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holder of a civil post. But in absence of any such Rule, this right or guarantee does not flow from Art. 311 of the Constitution. It need not be pointed out that initiation of a departmental proceeding per se does not visit the officer concerned with any evil consequences, and the framers of the Constitution did not consider it necessary to guarantee even that to holders of civil posts under the Union of India or under the State Government. At the same time this will not give right to authorities having the same rank as that of the officer against whom proceeding is to be initiated to take a decision whether any such proceeding should be initiated. In absence of a Rule, any superior authority who can be held to be the controlling authority, can initiate such proceeding.

5. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh (1970) 1 SCC 108, the departmental enquiry had been initiated against the Sub-Inspector of Police by the Superintendent of Police, who sent his enquiry report to the Inspector-General, who was the appointing auth