SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
KULDIP SINGH AND S. MOHAN, JJ.
J. S. Jadhav, Appellant
Versus
Mustafa Haji Mohamed Yusuf and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 6120 of 1983
Decided on 7-4-1993.
Advocates Act - Sections 38, 37 and 36 - Disciplinary committee - Civil court for recovery - Compromise decree appellant was counsel for respondent was requested to withdraw amount lying with court receiver and hand over same to the respondent - Letter of authorisation to enable appellant to receive amount was also issued - Pursuant to letter of authorisation and instructions, a total amount was withdrawn by appellant from court receiver Out of this, he paid only and rest was not paid - Respondent preferred a complaint before Bar Council of India - Appellant was issued a notice by Bar Council to he submitted his reply - On consideration of his reply and hearing the arguments - Disciplinary Committee of Bar Council of India – Held, Any person aggrieved by an order made by disciplinary committee of Bar Council of India under S. 36 or S. 37 - Attorney may within sixty days of on which order is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to the SC and the SC may pass such order thereon as it deems fit - Construed as to meet ends of justice – Court feel respondent should not be driven to a civil court for recovery of this amount even when appellant has been found guilty by his own peers which have also confirmed – Court direct that there shall be a decree in favour respondent for a sum together with interest at 9% per annum from complaint till payment - Hour has come when we must clear legal fields from poison and from fear – Court must remould our standards-build them higher, And clear air as though by cleansing fire, weed out the damning traitors to the law - Restore her to her ancient place of awe - Appeal dismissed
JUDGMENT
MOHAN, J..:—This is a statutory appeal under S. 38 of the Advocates Act of 1961.
2. The brief facts are as under:
The respondent engaged the appellant as a counsel in Suit No. 510 of 1964, this was in April, 1976. The suit was ultimately compromised on 14-6-77. It was ordered that out of the total amount lying with the court receiver, a sum of Rs. 64,000/- shall be paid over to the plaintiff; the balance was to be paid to the respondent and possession of suit property was to be handed over to the respondent by the court receiver.
3. During the pendency of the suit the court receiver inducted one Usman Ghani Haji Mohamed as a tenant. He filed CS No. 7 of 1978 praying for an interim injunction restraining the court receiver from handing over possession to the respondent. That suit was continued.
4. After the compromise decree was passed on 14-6-77 the appellant who was the counsel for the respondent was requested to withdraw the amount lying with the court receiver and hand over the same to the respondent. For this purpose, a letter of authorisation to enable the appellant to receive the amount was also issued. Pursuant to the letter of authorisation and instructions, a total amount of Rs. 50,379/ - was withdrawn by the appellant from the court receiver. Out of this, he paid only Rs. 18,000/ - and the rest was not paid. Therefore, the respondent preferred a complaint before the Bar Council of India on 9-1-81. The appellant was issued a notice by the Bar Council to which he submitted his reply. On consideration of his reply and hearing the arguments, the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, was of the view that the burden of proving the fact that the respondent had paid a sum of Rs. 50,379 lay on the appellant. Certain receipts produced to evidence payment to the respondent were not accepted. The plea of the appellant that the account books had been lost was held to be untrue. Ultimately the appellant was suspended for a period of two years and further directed to pay a sum of Rs. 500/- to the complainant (the respondent herein). It is against this order the present appeal has-been preferred.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant took us through the impugned order and urged that the Committee had not properly appreciated the evidence especially the receipts which were produced by the appellant to evidence the payment. It is incorrect to hold that the receipt dated 8-8-77 was a suspicious document merely because the account books were not produced, it would not follow that the payments made by the appellant could be disbelieved.
6. We pointed out to the learned counsel for the appellant that the order under appeal is unexceptional and there was no case for interference. We felt that the order of suspension of two years was not commensurate with the charges of misappropriation. Therefore, we directed to issue notice to the appellant which came to be accepted by the learned counsel Mr. Bharat Sangal. In spite of the fact that the appellant has not chosen to appear, in order to make over the payment of the amount voluntarily. Therefore, we are left with no option than to decide the case ourselves on merits.
7. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council on a proper appreciation of the evidence disbelieved the so-called receipts evidencing the payment. It has come to the correct conclusion that the receipt dated 8th of August, 1979 was got up on a blank signed paper. Hence, the due execution of the receipt had not been proved by the appellant. Besides, the statement of the appellant that the account books had been lost in transit had been rightly disbelieved. Under these circumstances this is a clear case wherein the misappropriation by the appellant has been fully established. Once this conclusion is arrived at, the question is what is the punishment to be imposed?
8. Advocacy is not a craft but a calling; a profession wherein devotion to duty constitutes the hallmark. Sincerity of performance and the earnestness of
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