The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the directions for plot allotment and dismissed the writ petition under Article 32 as an abuse of process, imposing costs on the petitioners.

ORDER

1. The litigation ultimately ended in Delhi Development Authority v. Surgical Coop. Industrial Estate Ltd. and the matters were disposed of by a Bench of three Judges of this Court with the following directions : (SCC g pp. 23-24, para 4)

"We, therefore, partly allow the appeal of the Delhi Development Authority insofar as these ten members are concerned and direct that on their depositing the amount in respect of plots calculated at 50% of Rs 10,756 per square metre the Delhi Development Authority will allot them the plots at or near about the site in question. As the total amount to be paid would depend on the area of the plot, we would direct the Delhi Development Authority to communicate the amount which each of these ten members will be required to pay at the above rate and on receipt of such communication the said ten members will make the payment within one month failing which they will forfeit their right to claim the plots allotted to them. Be it noted that no extension of time will be given because this is the third indulgence given to them. The appeals will stand disposed of as above with no order as to costs."

Now the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has been filed containing (sic contending) that contrary to the orders and also the letter was issued on 1-7-1994 directed the appellants to pay excess amounts and that, therefore, they should be protected by mandamus under Article 32 of the Constitution. The order passed by this Court exercising power under Article 136, became final and writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is not maintainable. The writ petition is sheer abuse of the process of the Court and so dismissed with costs of rupees thirty thousand, which the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee is entitled to recover from the petitioners.

2. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

For Citation : 1994 (6) SCC 97