1994 Supreme(SC) 1124
M.K.MUKHERJEE, S.MOHAN
Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha – Appellant
Versus
Eileenk. Patricia Drozarie (Mrs) – Respondent
Advocates:
D.N.MUKHERJI, GUDWILL INDIVER, N.R.CHAUDHARY, R.MUKHERJI, SHANKAR GOPAL PAGIRE
Judgement Key Points
- The tenancy in question was governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. [judgement_subject][1000256760003]
- Mrs. Sira Menan was the original tenant of the flat at premises No. 23, Lindsay Street, Calcutta, and died on August 12, 1970. [1000256760001]
- After the tenant's death, the respondent entered the flat on August 16, 1970, claiming to be the deceased tenant's daughter and sole heir, entitling her to continue as tenant. [1000256760001][1000256760002]
- The appellants filed suit for eviction, alleging the respondent was a trespasser as she was neither the daughter nor residing with the deceased tenant. [1000256760001]
- The trial court held the respondent was not the daughter of the deceased tenant and, even if assumed to be, was not ordinarily residing with her at the time of death, thus not a tenant under Section 2(h) of the Act; eviction was granted. [1000256760003]
- The High Court reversed the trial court's findings on both issues and dismissed the suit. [1000256760003]
- The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the respondent was the daughter of the deceased tenant. [1000256760004]
- The sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether the respondent, as daughter and heir, qualified as a tenant under Section 2(h) of the Act. [1000256760004]
- Appellants contended that under Section 2(h), only heirs ordinarily residing with the tenant (contractual or statutory) at death inherit tenancy rights. [1000256760005]
- Respondent argued that "such person" in "in the event of such person's death" under Section 2(h) refers only to a statutory tenant (continuing in possession post-termination), not a contractual tenant; all heirs of a contractual tenant inherit. [1000256760006]
- Pre-1965 Section 2(h) defined tenant as a contractual tenant or statutory tenant (continuing in possession post-termination), excluding those against whom eviction decree/order exists; statutory tenancy rights were personal and not heritable to all heirs. (!) [1000256760007][1000256760008][1000256760009]
- The 1965 amendment to Section 2(h) added: "or in the event of such person's death, such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death." (!) [1000256760010]
- The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 1965 amendment aimed at giving rights to heirs of a statutory tenant to retain possession after death. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) [1000256760011]
- Statements of Objects and Reasons may be used to understand legislative background, antecedent state, and object, but not to interpret substantive provisions. [1000256760012]
- Interpreting the amendment in context, "such person's death" refers only to the statutory tenant (continuing in possession post-termination), extending protection to their ordinarily residing heirs; it does not limit heirs of contractual tenants. [1000256760012]
- Applying the residing requirement to contractual tenants would restrict pre-amendment heritability to all heirs, contrary to amendment's purpose. [1000256760013]
- The deceased Mrs. Menan was a contractual tenant at death; thus, the respondent inherited tenancy as heir, rendering the residence question irrelevant. [1000256760014]
- Appeal dismissed without costs. [1000256760014] (!)
JUDGMENT
M. K MUKHERJEE. : - I.A. No.2. of 1994 allowed.
2. At all material times one Mrs. Sira Menan was a tenant under the appellants in respect of a flat in premises No. 23, Lindsay Street, Calcutta. After her death on August 12, 1970, the appellants filed the suit, out of which the instant appeal arises, alleging that the respondent, claiming herself to be the daughter of the deceased, had entered into the flat on August 16, 1970 with her family and was residing therein since then. According to the appellants such claim of the respondent was a false one as Mrs. Menan had all along lived in the flat alone and the respondent was never seen to visit her, much less live therein. By filing the suit the appellants, therefore, prayed for recovery of the flat on a declaration that the respondent was a rank trespasser and liable to be evicted therefrom.
3. In contesting the suit the respondent asserted that she was the daughter of the deceased tenant and had been living in the flat since the inception of the tenancy. Consequently, she claimed, that upon her mothers death she, as her sole heir, became a tenant under the appellants.
4. In the context of the respective stands of the parties
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