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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S. MOHAN AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.
Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha and others, Appellants
Versus
Mrs. Eileen K. Patricia DRozarie, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No.1954 of 1992
Decided on 10-11-1994
West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1965 - Section,2(h) - Court of competent jurisdiction - Claim of respondent - Context of respective stands of parties and in view of admitted fact that tenancy was governed by West Bengal Premises Tenancy for short two questions that fell for determination before trial Court were whether respondent was daughter of deceased tenant and if so whether she was entitled to inherit tenancy- On consideration of evidence adduced by parties trial Court that respondent was not daughter of deceased and even if it was assumed that she was she would not be a tenant within meaning Act as she was not ordinarily residing with her mother at time of her death- Resultantly trial Court granted reliefs sought for by appellants- In appeal by respondent High Court disagreed with both findings of trial court and dismissed suit- Hence this appeal by special leave -Held, Tenant means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent of any premises is but for special contract would be payable and includes any person continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy or in event of such persons death such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at time of his death but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a Court Reasons accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to ascertain true meaning and effect of substantive provisions of legislation but it can certainly be pressed into service for limited purpose of understanding background antecedent state of affairs and object legislation sought to achieve- If substitution of words" include any person continuing possession after termination of his tenancy or event of such persons death such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him time of his death amended definition of tenant Act is read in context of aforesaid Statement of Objects and Reasons and proximity between date of delivery of judgment case and issuance of Ordinance re cannot be any manner of doubt that amendment was brought in to give protection not only to statutory tenant but also to such his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him in demised premises at time of his death- That necessarily means that words in event of such persons death refer only to death of person who was continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy and not also person referred in its earlier clause namely contractual tenant matter can be viewed from another angle also- If words" such persons death are to refer both clauses relating to contractual tenant and statutory tenant as suggested would mean that right of tenancy which before amendment of was to devolve upon all heirs of a contractual tenant would after amendment be limited to those heirs who were ordinarily residing with him at time of his death and not all-Such an extravagant interpretation would militate against purpose spirit and letter of amendment foregoing discussion and in view of admitted contractual tenant at time of her death it must therefore be held that respondent inherited tenancy as her heir- Consequently question as to whether she was ordinarily residing with her mother at time of her death becomes redundant- Court therefore dismiss appeal but without any order as to costs- - Appeal dismissed
JUDGMENT
M. K MUKHERJEE. : - I.A. No.2. of 1994 allowed.
2. At all material times one Mrs. Sira Menan was a tenant under the appellants in respect of a flat in premises No. 23, Lindsay Street, Calcutta. After her death on August 12, 1970, the appellants filed the suit, out of which the instant appeal arises, alleging that the respondent, claiming herself to be the daughter of the deceased, had entered into the flat on August 16, 1970 with her family and was residing therein since then. According to the appellants such claim of the respondent was a false one as Mrs. Menan had all along lived in the flat alone and the respondent was never seen to visit her, much less live therein. By filing the suit the appellants, therefore, prayed for recovery of the flat on a declaration that the respondent was a rank trespasser and liable to be evicted therefrom.
3. In contesting the suit the respondent asserted that she was the daughter of the deceased tenant and had been living in the flat since the inception of the tenancy. Consequently, she claimed, that upon her mothers death she, as her sole heir, became a tenant under the appellants.
4. In the context of the respective stands of the parties and in view of the admitted fact that the tenancy of Mrs. Menan was governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956( Act for short) the two questions that fell for determination before the trial Court were(i) whether the respondent was the daughter of the deceased tenant and, if so,(ii)whether she was entitled to inherit the tenancy. On consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties the trial Court held that the respondent was not the daughter of the deceased and even if it was assumed that she was, she would not be a tenant within the meaning of S.2(h) of the Act as she was not ordinarily residing with her mother at the time of her death. Resultantly, the trial Court granted the reliefs sought for by the appellants. In appeal by the respondent the High Court disagreed with both the findings of the trial court and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by special leave
5. Having perused the evidence on record we are in complete agreement with the High Court that the trial Court was not at all justified in holding that the respondent was not the daughter of the deceased tenant. Besides, the above finding of the High Court was not assailed by the appellants before us. The only question, therefore, that survives for our consideration in this appeal is whether the respondent, as daughter of the deceased tenant, can claim herself to be tenant under S.2(h) of the Act.
6. Dr. Ghose, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that from the definition of the tenant as appearing in S. 2(h) of the Act it would be patently clear that only those heirs of the tenant - whether contractual or statutory - who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death would only succeed as a tenant and not all the heirs. According to Dr. Ghose the words" in the event of such persons death" in S.2(h) relate not only to persons whose tenancy subsists but also to those who are continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy. Dr. Ghose contended that once S.2(h) was so interpreted - as it should be - the appellant was bound to succeed for the finding of the High Court after the resondent was ordinarily residing with the erstwhile tenant at the time of her death was patently wrong and opposed to the evidence on record.
7. Both the above contentions of Dr. Ghose were resisted by Mr. Mukherji, appearing on behalf of the respondent. According to Mr. Mukherji, the word such person appearing in the phrase" in the event of such persons death" in S.2(h) refer only to the person who is continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy and do not and cannot refer also to a contractual tenant, for he has an estate or interest in the subject-matter of the tenancy and heritability being an incidence of the tenancy it will devolv
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