2004 Supreme(SC) 1602

2005(1) Supreme 393
Supreme Court of India
(From Delhi High Court)
N. Santosh Hegde, S.N. Variava, B.P. Singh, H.K. Sema & S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Nathi Devi —Appellant
versus
Radha Devi Gupta —Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 5027 of 1999
Decided on 17-12-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Vinoo Bhagat, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Sanjeev Sachdeva and Ms. Priya Puri, Advocates.

Important pointSection 14D of Delhi Rent Control Act gives a right to file eviction petition under that provision only to a widow who had let out the premises or whose husband had let out the premises.

Headnote:Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958—Section 14D (Inserted by Act 57 of 1988)—Classified landlord “a widow” —Right to seek eviction on ground that she required premises for her bonafide personal need—Expression “premises let out by her or by her husband”—Section gives a right to file application under the provision only to a widow who had let out premises or whose husband had let out the premises—If premises was let out by some one else, Section 14D will not apply—Widow’s right to recover immediate possession of the premises arises only if premises were let out by her or by her husband—Appellant-tenant was in occupation of suit premises as let out by erstwhile landlord owner in 1959-60—Respondent-petitioner widow claimed to have purchased suit property in 1982—Eviction petition was filed in 1994—Eviction petition in such circumstances by the widow was not maintainable—Eviction order passed by Rent Controller and upheld by High Court was liable to be set aside.

       Held : Section 14D confers a right on a widow of the landlord to seek immediate possession of the premises let out “by her, or by her husband”. The scheme of these Sections appears to be that where the landlord is alive and the premises have been let out by him, he only can make an application for immediate possession of the premises for his own use. Only in the case of his death his dependant under Section 14-A, and his widow under Section 14D can seek immediate possession of the premises. The use of the expression, “let out by him” in Section 14B and 14C and the expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” in Section 14D have significance. If it was unnecessary in the scheme of these Sections as to who had actually let out the premises, the legislature would not have used the term “let out by him” or “let out by her, or by her husband”. In interpreting a provision one cannot assume that the words employed by the legislature are redundant. Section 14D gives a right to file an application under that provision only to a widow who had let out the premises or whose husband had let out the premises. Consequently, if the premises had been let out by someone else, Section 14D will not apply. As pointed out in Surjit Singh Kalra (supra) the expression used in Section 14B is “the premises let out by him”, unlike the expression used in Section 14(1)(e) where the legislature employed the expression “the premises let out for residential purposes”. Thus in the case of a landlord belonging to the general category it was immaterial whether the premises was let out by him or by someone else, as long as he was the landlord of the premises at the time of making an application seeking eviction of the tenant. But the expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” conveys a different meaning altogether. The widow’s right to recover immediate possession of the premises arises only if the premises were let out by her or by her husband, and not by anyone else. It appears to us that the legislature has purposely employed a different expression in Section 14D as also in Section 14B and 14C. We are here concerned with an application filed under Section 14D which specifies in clear terms that a widow can invoke the provisions only if she has let out the premises, or if her husband had let out the premises. If, as ­observed in Kanta Goel (supra), the expression, “the premises let out by him” has been used only to convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lease must be under him directly, and not that he had himself let out the premises, the legislature would not have then used the expression “let out by her, or by her husband.” The very fact that the Section specifies that the premises must be one which was let out by the widow or by her husband implies that the provision would not apply to a premises let out by any other person. (Para 28)

       By expressly providing that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband, the legislature has clearly excluded from the purview of the said provision “premises let out by any other person” even if in course of time the widow may have become its landlord. We are obliged to read the provision as it is, and cannot give it a meaning by deleting an expression expressly employed by the legislature. The expression, “let out by her, or by her husband” is not an expression which permits of any ambiguity. We must, therefore, give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclusion is inescapable that the legislature intent was only to confer a special right on a limited class of widows viz. the widow who let the premises or whose husband had let the premises before his death, and which premises the widow requires for her own use. (Para 28)

       Section 14D uses the expression, “premises let out by her, or by her husband” which are required by the widow for her own residence. She may apply to the Rent Controller for recovering the immediate possession of “such premises”. “Such premises” obviously is relatable to the premises let out her or by her husband. It cannot take within its ambit any other premises which may have been let out by any other person. We, therefore, find substance in the submission urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 14D benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the premises owned by her and the expressions, “let out by her or by her husband” and “such premises” in Section 14D would be redundant. The High Court, therefore, fell in error in thinking that only two conditions were required to be fulfilled for the application of Section 14D namely, the landlady is a widow, and the premises are required by her for her residence. In addition to these two requirements, in our view, Section 14D insists that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions of Section 14D to evict a preexisting tenant. (Para 32)

       (ii) Interpretation of Statute—True legislative intent is to be discovered—If words are clear plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, Court must give to words that meaning—Efforts should be made to give effect to each and every word used by legislature—Literal interpretation should be given to a statute if same did not lead to an absurdity. (Paras 13 to 15)