2005 Supreme(SC) 374

2005(2) Supreme 314
Supreme Court of India
(From Punjab and Haryana High Court)
N. Santosh Hegde & S.B. Sinha, JJ.
Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank —Appellants
versus
Neelam —Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 1672 of 2002
Decided on 28-2-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Sanjay R. Hegde, Anil K. Mishra, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Keshav Kaushik, K.B. Raina, Dr. Kailash Chand and Ms. Minakshi Vij, Advocates.

Important point
Although the Court cannot import a ­period of limitation when statute does not provide the same but it does not mean that irrespective of facts and circumstances of the case, a stale claim must be entertained and that procedural laws like estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are equally applicable to industrial proceedings.

Headnote:(i) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Section 25—Industrial dispute—Principle of Res-judicata—Respondent workman filed writ petition before High Court for same relief which she later on prosecuted before Labour Court—Writ petition was withdrawn without a prayer to prosecute remedy before ­Labour Court—Whether proceedings before Labour Court were barred by res-judicata? No.

       Held : The writ petition filed by the Respondent concededly was not adjudicated on merit. Apparently, she did not avail the alter­native remedy which was more efficacious. Before the Labour Court even disputed questions of fact could be gone into and adjudicated upon which would ordinarily not be permissible in a writ proceeding. If the Res­pondent had made a prayer for withdrawal of a writ petition on the said ground, she cannot be denied the remedy available to her in another jurisdiction in terms of the provisions of the statute. The principles ­embodied in Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure laying down a public policy is not applicable to a case of this nature. A writ petition filed by the Respondent could have been dismissed even on the ground that another alternative remedy which was more efficacious was available and furthermore on the ground that the writ court would not go into the disputed question of fact. Even in such an event, it was open to the Respondent herein to approach the Labour Court or to take recourse to other remedies which were otherwise available to her.

       In Sarguja Transport (supra), it was observed:

       “...While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission.....

       The Labour Court, therefore, in our opinion, wrongly applied the principles of res judicata. (Para 9)

       (ii) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Section 25—Industrial dispute—Belated claim—Although Court could not import a period of limitation when statute did not prescribe the same, it did not mean that irrespective of facts and circumstances of the case, a stale claim must be entertained by appropriate Government—Procedural laws like estoppel, waiver and acquiescence were equally applicable to industrial proceedings—Respondent workman was appointed on ad hoc basis in appellant bank in 1985 and she worked as clerk-typist for one year and three months when her employment was discontinued by Bank—She joined another ­establishment of the State Government in 1988—She had approached Labour Court after more than 7 years—Labour Court considered it as relevant factor for refusing relief to her—High Court was not justified to interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

       Held : It is trite that the courts and tribunals having plenary jurisdiction have discretionary power to grant an appropriate relief to the parties. The aim and object of the Industrial Disputes Act may be to impart social justice to the workman but the same by itself would not mean that irrespective of his conduct a workman would automatically he entitled to relief. The procedural laws like estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are equally applicable to the industrial proceedings. A person in certain situation may even be held to be bound by the doctrine of Acceptance Sub silentio. The Respondent herein did not raise any industrial dispute questioning the termination of her services within a reasonable time. She even accepted an alternative employment and has been ­continuing therein from 10.8.1988. In her ­replication filed before the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court while traversing the plea raised by the Appellant herein that she is gainfully employed in HUDA with effect from 10.8.1988 and her services had been regularized therein, it was averred:

       “6. The applicant workman had already given replication to the A.L.C. cum Conciliation Officer, stating therein that she was engaged by HUDA from 10.8.1988 as Clerk-cum-Typist on daily wage basis. The applicant workman has the right to come to the service of the management and she is interested to join them.”

       She, therefore, did not deny or dispute that she had been regularly employed or her services had been regularized. She merely exercised her right to join the service of the Appellant. (Para 16)

       It is true that the Respondent had filed a writ petition within a period of three years but indisputably the same was filed only after the other workmen obtained same relief from the Labour Court in a reference made in that behalf by the State. Evidently in the writ petition she was not in a position to establish her legal right so as to obtain a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the Appellant herein to reinstate her in service. She was advised to withdraw the writ petition presumably because she would not have obtained any relief in the said proceeding. Even the High Court could have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay or could have otherwise refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The conduct of the Appellant in approaching the Labour Court after more than seven years had, therefore, been considered to be a relevant factor by the Labour Court for refusing to grant any relief to her. Such a consideration on the part of the Labour Court cannot be said to be an irrelevant one. The Labour Court in the aforementioned situation cannot be said to have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction injudiciously, arbitrarily and capriciously warranting interference at the hands of the High Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. (Para 17)