Important point
An order interim in nature or which did not finally decide the lis could not be challenged by way of revision under Section 115 CPC.

Judgment

Srikrishna, J.—Leave granted.

2. This appeal demonstrates how a determined and dishonest litigant can interminably drag on litigation to frustrate the results of a judicial determination in favour of the other side.

3. A property bearing No. 202B Arjun Nagar, Safdarjung Enclave in New Delhi was purchased by the first appellant and her husband late R.S. Gupta under two sale deeds dated 1.5.1970 and 2.5.1974. On 1.11.1987 the appellant committed perhaps the gravest blunder of her life of letting out the suit property to the respondent-tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 1300/-, which subsequently came to be increased to Rs. 1500/- w.e.f. 1.1.1990. The tenancy was for residential purpose.

4. The appellant filed a petition for eviction of the respondent by invoking section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘DRC Act’). This petition was filed by late R.S. Gupta, husband of the appellant No. 1 before us, who was also a co-petitioner in the said eviction petition. The ground put forward in the eviction petition was that the family of the appellant had expanded and there was bona fide requirement for personal use. This eviction petition was contested by the respondent who raised several grounds. To start with, the respondent raised a preliminary objection that there existed no relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellant No. 1 and himself. He also denied that the appellant No. 1 was the owner of the suit property. Curiously, however, he did not deny the payment of rent to the 1st appellant through her husband. The eviction petition No. E-223/94 was tried and allowed by the court of Additional Rent Controller. On the basis of the evidence recorded before him the Additional Rent Controller specifically found that it was established that the appellants who were the owners/landlord in respect of the suit premises. He also examined the case put forward on behalf of the appellants on merits and held that all the essential ingredients for eviction under section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act had been proved. By his judgment dated 1.8.1998, a decree for eviction was made.

5. The respondent challenged the decree for possession by his revision petition under section 25 of the DRC Act before the High Court vide CR No. 1017/98. The learned single judge by his judgment dated 4.5.1999 dismissed the revision petition specifically upholding the findings of the court below that the present appellant No. 1 was the owner in respect of suit property and that there was no force in the arguments that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant as between the present appellant No. 1 and the present respondent. The High Court also accepted the finding on the merits that the grounds for eviction had been made out. The respondent moved a special leave petition before this Court, S.L.P. (C) No. 7234/99, challenging the judgment of the High Court. This special leave petition was summarily dismissed by this Court on 21.6.1999.

6. Despite his failure in all courts, the respondent did not hand over possession. The appellant filed an execution petition on 11.8.1999 for execution of the decree for possession. The respondent raised all kinds of frivolous objections including the objection that DRC Act was not applicable to the area in question; that the sale deed under which the first appellant claimed the ownership was a fraudulent document and could not be made the basis of eviction order; that the identity of the suit premises was different and that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between them. All these objections were carefully evaluated by the executing court which took the view that all of them had been the subject matters of the trial before the decree was made that it was not open to the executing court to re-open questions settled before the decree was granted. The court also rejected the plea of fraud as no such plea had been raised during the trial. In this view of the matter the executing court