Important point
The Delhi School Tribunal is a judicial authority within the meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Headnote:(i) Delhi School Education Act, 1973—Sections 8(3), 12 and 15—Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—Section 8(1)—Montfort School Staff Rules—Rules 24 and 31—Arbitration of disputes arising out of any breach of contract between the employee and the managing committee—Remedy available to dismissed employee of an unaided minority institution—Disciplinary action was taken against respondent, Assistant teacher in an unaided minority institution—Order of termination—Appeal filed before Delhi School Tribunal—Managing Committee of the school filed an application u/s 8(1) of the Arbitration Act for reference to an arbitrator—Tribunal dismissed the application—Writ petition filed by appellant—Single Judge of the High Court upheld the view of the Tribunal holding that the Tribunal was not required to refer the appeal to an arbitrator—Appeal against—Whether Tribunal is a judicial authority and/or whether it exercises judicial power in the background of sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act—(Yes).
       Held : A question has been raised as to whether the Tribunal is a judicial authority and/or whether it exercises judicial power in the background of sub-Section (1) of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. The expression ‘Judicial Authority’ has not been defined under the said Act. The Tribunal is presided by a judicial officer of equal rank of the District Judge. The expenditure incurred on the Tribunal is defrayed from the Consolidated Funds of India. It is vested with the power to regulate its own proceedings and is vested with same powers as are vested in a Court of Law under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the ‘CPC’). One important factor is that the Tribunal has a power to stay the operation of the order appealed against. Finality has been attached to the order of the Tribunal subject to any judicial review under Article 226/227 or Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). Meaning of the words “act judicially” and “judicial power” need to be noted at this juncture. Provisions of Section 11 of the Act clearly vest all the powers of a civil appellate court in the Tribunal while dealing with an appeal preferred before it under Section 8(3) of the Act. (Paras 13 and 14)
       At first flush, Sections 8(3) and 15 of the Act may appear to be self-contradictory. But it is really not so, when considered in the background of what is stated in Frank Anthony and St. Xaviers’ cases (supra). By giving benefit of Section 8(3) to employees of recognized unaided minority schools, they are put at par with their counterparts in private schools. The two provisions serve similar purpose i.e. providing a forum for ventilating grievances before a forum. Once a remedy under one is exhausted it is not permissible to avail the other one. (Para 17)
       While accepting the stand of the appellant in a given case the provisions of Section 8(3) of the Act could be rendered nugatory by requiring the Tribunal to refer the matter to an arbitrator. In view of what has been stated above, the inevitable conclusion is that the Civil Appeal No. 6593 of 2003 is sans merit. (Paras 20 and 21)
       (ii) Words and Phrases—Words ‘act judicially’ and ‘judicial power’—Meanings. (Paras 16 & 17)

Judgment

Arijit Pasayat, J.—Judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court holding that the Delhi School Tribunal (in short the ‘Tribunal’) while hearing appeal of a dismissed employee of the appellant-school preferred under Section 8(3) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (in short the ‘Act’) was not required to refer the appeal to an arbitrator on an application being filed before it by the management of the school under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short the ‘Arbitration Act’) is under challenge in this appeal.

2. Factual position is almost undisputed and it is unnecessary to set out the details. In a nutshell the same is as follows:

Managing Committee of an un-aided minority institution is the appellant. The respondent No.1- Vijay Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the ‘employee’) was working as an Assistant Teacher in the school known as Montfort Senior Secondary School (hereinafter referred to as the ‘School’). Disciplinary action was taken against him and by order dated 4.5.2000 the Managing Committee terminated his services. Against the order of termination, an appeal was preferred before the Tribunal under Section 8(3) of the Act. The present appellant filed an application under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration Act for reference to an arbitrator. The Tribunal dismissed the application by its order dated 7.6.2001. The same was challenged in a writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court and a learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment upheld the view of the Tribunal and dismissed the writ petition.

3. In support of the appeal, it was submitted that Chapter V of the Act applies to un-aided minority schools and Section 15 of the Act deals with contract of service. Clause (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 15 deals with arbitration of dispute arising out of any breach of contract between the employee and the managing committee with regard to certain aspects. It is submitted that clause (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 15 clearly makes arbitration mandatory. As per the requirement of Section 15 the school is legally bound to enter into a written contract of service with every employee. Since there is a specific provision for an arbitration and there is no dispute that a written contract of service was entered into, the Tribunal was in law required to refer the matter to an arbitrator. The Service Rules for the staff of the school govern the conditions of service. They are called “Montfort School Staff Rules” (in short `Staff Rules”) and have come into effect from 1st July, 1974. Reference is made to Rule 24 dealing with Code of Conduct and Rule 31 containing an arbitration clause. Chapter IV of the Act deals with terms and conditions of service of recognized private schools. Section 12 of the Act states that the provision of Chapter IV is not applicable to un-aided minority schools. Though Section 12 of the Act was held to be discriminatory and void in Frank Anthony Public School Employees’ Association v. Union of India and Ors. (AIR 1987 SC 311) and The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (AIR 1974 SC 1389), yet effect of Section 15 cannot be diluted.

4. There is no appearance on behalf of respondent No. 1. Therefore, considering the importance of the matter involved, we requested Mr. P.S. Narasimha to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae. He has placed various provisions of the Act and referring to decisions in Frank Anthony and St. Xaviers cases (supra), he submitted that the decision of a learned Single Judge does not require any interference. According to him full effect has to be given to both Chapter IV and V.

5. In order to appreciate the rival submissions the relevant provisions of the Act need to be noted. While Chapter IV prescribes various statutory rights, privileges and remedies for the employees of private aided schools, Chapter V is restricted in its operation and enables creation of contractual rights with the employees of

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2005 Supreme(SC) 1173

Important pointThe Delhi School Tribunal is a judicial authority within the meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Cases Referred (7)

Important point
The Delhi School Tribunal is a judicial authority within the meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.