2005 Supreme(SC) 1356

2005(7) Supreme 155
Supreme Court of India
(From Andhra Pradesh High Court)
S.B. Sinha & R.V. Raveendran, JJ.
State through Inspector of Police, A.P. —Appellant
versus
K. Narasimhachary —Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 82 of 2004
Decided on 7-10-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : P. Vinay Kumar, Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy and Sneha Bhaskaran, Advocates.
For the Respondent : Srinivas R. Rao and Ms. Neeru Vaid, Advocates.

Headnote:Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988—Sections 7, 11, 13(3) r/w 13(1)(d) and 19—Respondent-accused posted as Mandal Revenue Inspector, was convicted by trial Court for having demanded and accepted Rs. 600/- for issuing valuation certificate of his property—High Court set aside conviction holding that order of sanction was not proved by PW6 in accordance with law and on merits charge was not proved beyond doubt—State appeal—Order of sanction was issued in name of Governor—Secretary to the Government merely authenticated said order—It was a public document u/s 74 of Evidence Act and PW6 proved signature of Secretary to State Government who had authenticated it—Respondent had allowed said document to be exhibited without any demur—He could not be permitted to question admissibility of said document for first time before appellate Court—High Court wrongly applied Section 47 of Evidence Act and to arrive a finding that sanction was not validly proved—Prosecution case was however not free from doubt—It was PW4 who was to evaluate the property and PW3 who was to grant the certificate and respondent was only a recommending authority—Conduct of accused and circumstances created doubt in story—PW1 complainant was influential person and close of PW3—Acquittal called for no interference.

       Held : A bare perusal of the order of sanction shows that the allegation as against the Respondent herein for taking into consideration that the Government of Andhra Pradesh, who was the competent authority to remove the said Sri K. Narasimha Chari, Mandal Revenue Inspector, Cuddapah, from the Government Service, after fully and carefully examining the material placed before them in respect of the said allegations and having regard to the circumstances of the case considered that the Respondent should be prosecuted in the court of law; whereupon the order of sanction was issued in the name of the Governor. Shri N. Madanmohan Reddy, Secretary to the Government, merely authenticated the said order of sanction which was issued in the name of the Governor of Andhra Pradesh. The order of sanction was, thus, issued by the State in discharge of its statutory functions in terms of Section 19 of the Act. The order of sanction was authenticated. The said order of sanction was an executive action of a State having been issued in the name of the Governor. It was authenticated in the manner specified in the Rules of Executive Business. The authenticity of the said order has not been questioned. It was, therefore, a public document within the meaning of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. PW-6 proved the signature of Shri N. Madanmohan Reddy. He identified his signature. He was not cross-examined on the premise that he did not know the signature of Shri N. Madanmohan Reddy. In answer to the only question put to him, he stated “By the time the Secretary signed in Ex.P.17 I was in G.A.D.” Nothing was, thus, elicited in the cross-examination of the said witness to show that he was not a competent witness to identify the signature of Shri Madanmohan Reddy. The Respondent, therefore, allowed the said document to be exhibited without any demur. He did not question the admissibility of the said document before the Trial Court, either when the same was exhibited or at the final hearing before the trial court. He, therefore, could not be permitted to question the admissibility of the said document for the first time before the appellate court. [See Ranvir Singh and Another Vs. Union of India, 2005 AIR SCW 4565 : 2005 (7) SCALE 238]. A public document can be proved in terms of Sections 76 to 78 of the Evidence Act. A public document can be proved otherwise also. The High Court, therefore, was not correct in invoking the provisions of Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act in the instant case as it was not called upon to form an opinion as to by whom the said order of sanction was written and signed. PW-6 was not examined as an expert or was required to give his opinion as regard the correctness or otherwise of the signature of the said N. Madanmohan Reddy. The authenticity of the said document was never in question. (Paras 11 to 14)

       It is, therefore, evident that the High Court misread and misconstrued the law laid down by this Court in the aforementioned decision. It also wrongly applied Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. (Para 16)

       So far as the merit of the matter is concerned, as would appear from the discussions made hereinbefore that the prosecution case is not entirely free from doubt. PW-1 intended to obtain a signature as regard valuation of his lands so as to enable him to get himself registered with the Public Works Department as a contractor. He went to PW-3. PW-3 did not send the same to the Respondent by following the existing procedure. He merely initialed the same and handed over it back to PW-1 allegedly for the purpose of giving it to the Respondent who in turn asked to take it to PW-4. It is really curious that when PW-1 handed over the application to PW-4 on 2.3.1994, on the same day his statement as also the statement of his grandmother were recorded and all the documents, namely, Ext. P-2 and P-6 were handed over by him to PW-1 who in turn handed them over to the Respondent. It was at this stage the purported demand was said to have been made. Strangely enough he met the Respondent in the evening of 03.03.1994, although a demand was said to have been made by the Respondent on 02.03.1994 in the office, presumably after office hours and then the amount of gratification was reduced from Rs. 1,000/- to Rs. 600/-. PW-1 did not make any complaint to PW-3 on the said date i.e. 03.03.1994 and even on 04.03.1994, although from the conduct of PW-1 and PW-3, it is evident that they were very close to each other. PW-3 apparently intended to help him out of way. The valuation certificate was sent to PW-3 by the Respondent on 04.03.1994 which was signed by PW-3 on the same day. It was also certified by PW-4. It is wholly unlikely that although his demand was not met, the Respondent would forward his certificate to PW-3. The natural conduct of the Respondent, if he had in fact demanded any amount by way of gratification, would have been to wait for PW-1 to meet his demand. It is not in dispute that it was PW-4, who was to evaluate the property and it was PW-3 who was to grant the certificate. The Respondent was merely a recommending authority. (Paras 20 to 22)

       PW-1 appears to be an influential person. He could approach PW-3 directly. He was in a position to obtain a certificate, copies of various documents from PW-4 on the same day as also obtain a certificate from him on the same day. Thus, as the valuation certificate was sent to PW-3 by the Respondent on 04.03.1994, there does not appear to be any good reason as to why PW-1 would not come to know thereabout. According to him, he came to know that PW-8 was at Cuddapah and be approached him in the early morning at 6.35 on 05.03.1994. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that two views are possible and the view of the High Court cannot be said to be wholly improbable; it cannot be said, in view of the discussions made hereinbefore, that the materials brought on records would lead to only one conclusion, i.e., the guilt of the accused. The impugned judgment, therefore, is sustained. (Paras 24 and 25)