2005 Supreme(SC) 1527

2005(8) Supreme 120
Supreme Court of India
(From Calcutta High Court)
K.G. Balakrishnan & Arun Kumar, JJ.
Competent Authority —Appellant
versus
Barangore Jute Factory & Ors. —Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 7015 of 2005
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16820 of 2004)
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 7016-7017 of 2005
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 17874-17875 of 2004)
And
Civil Appeal No. 7018 of 2005
(@ SLP (C) No. 18773 of 2004)
Decided on 23-11-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Jayanta Mitra, Sr. Advocate, Tara Chandra Sharma, Sanjeev Sen and Ms. Neelam Sharma, Advocates.
For the National Highway Authority of India : Mukul Rohtagi, Sr. Advocate, Ravi Kini, Krishna Kumar, Sumit Dhingra, Sandeep Tiwari, V.B. Joshi, Advocates.
For the Respondents : V.P. Singh, K.K. Venugopal, Sr. Advocates, B.K. Jain, Pankaj Jain, S. Kirpal, A.K. Jain, Prateek Jalan, Advocates.

Important point
Wherever the acquisition is of a portion of a bigger piece of land, an acquisition notification issued u/s 3A of the National Highways Act is required to convey to the persons claiming interest in the land the description of the land sought to be acquired.

Headnote:(i) National Highways Act, 1956—Section 3A—Acquisition of certain lands u/s 3A—Notification regarding compulsory acquisition of land challenged as bad in law—Impugned notification is challenged on ground that it does not give a brief description of the land sought to be compulsorily acquired—Only a part of the land out of a bigger chunk of land is sought to be acquired—Allegations that the absence of information as to which part of the land is being acquired makes the description insufficient, rather vague—Owners are not in a position to identify the land under acquisition—Statutory requirement of a brief description of land is not fulfilled even though plot numbers of land in respect of each mouza are given—Whether impugned Notification meets the requirement of Section 3A(1) of the Act—(No)—Whether delay in challenging the Notification renders the challenge liable to be rejected—(No).

       Held : Even though plot numbers of land in respect of each mouza are given, different pieces of land are acquired either as whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a portion of a bigger piece of land, there is no description as to which portion was being acquired. Unless it is known as to which portion was to be acquired, the petitioners would be unable to understand the impact of acquisition or to raised any objection about user of the acquired land for the purposes specified under the Act or to make a claim for compensation. It is settled law that where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be given its due meaning. In our view, the impugned notification fails to meet the statutory mandate. It is vague. The least that is required in such cases is that the acquisition notification should let the person whose land is sought to be acquired know what he is going to lose. The impugned notification in this case is, therefore, not in accordance with the law. While dealing with the question of brief description of land in the acquisition notifications, reference was made to some judgments of this Court where acquisition. Notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act had come up for consideration on account of challenge being leveled on ground of vagueness of the Notifications. In most of these cases, Plan of the area under acquisition was made part of the notifications to show that the requirement of description of land was met. This lead us to inquire whether there was any site plan forming part of the impugned Notification. (Para 6)

       A reference to the impugned Notification shows that there is no mention of any Plan. Without this how can anybody know that there was a Plan which could be inspected and inspected where? We are inclined to accept that there was no Plan accompanying the impugned Notification. During the course of hearing we were shown a Plan which we are unable to link with the impugned Notification. This was a 1996 P.W.D. Plan. (Para 7)

       The absence of any reference to a Plan in the impugned Notification and in fact non-availability of any Plan linked to the Notification, fortifies the argument that the description of the land under acquisition in the impugned Notification fails to meet the legal requirement of a brief description of the land which renders the Notification invalid. (Para 7)

       The absence of plan also renders the right to file objections under Section 3C(1) nugatory. In the absence of a Plan, it is impossible to ascertain or know which part of acquired land was to be used and in what manner. Without this knowledge no objections regarding use of land could be filed. Since the objection regarding use of the land had been given up by the writ petitioners, we need not go any further in this aspect. We would, however, like to add that unlike Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which confers a general right to object to acquisition of land under Section 4 of the said Act, Section 3C(1) of the National Highways Act gives a very limited right to object. The objection can be only to the use of the land under acquisition for purposes other than those under sub-section 3A(1). The Act confers no right to object to acquisition as such. This answers the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the NHAI that failure to file objections disentitles Writ Petitioners to object to the acquisition. The Act confers no general right to object, therefore, failure to object becomes irrelevant. (Para 8)

       It is true that 11th June, 1998 Notification was challenged only in September, 2001 by filing the Writ Petition. But if the Notification violates the very statute from which it derives its force, will delay in challenging it clothe it with legitimacy? The Act requires the Notification to be issued in a particular manner with brief particulars of land being acquired. The Notification in this case fails to meet this requirement. We have held it to be bad in law. It has no legs to stand. The conduct of the opposite party cannot be used to make it stand. Moreover, the Writ Petitioners have explained the reasons for the delay in filing the Writ Petition. The Company which owns the lands had been de-registered. It is a Company registered in the U.K. It had to be revived. Revival came in mid-2001 whereafter the action was taken. Thus we find no merit in the argument about delay in challenging the Notification rendering the challenge liable to be rejected. (Para 9)

       (ii) National Highways Act, 1956—Sections 3A, 3D, 3E, 3G, 3H—Acquisition of certain lands—Notification has been held to be not in accordance with law failing to meet statutory requirement of Section 3A—Writ petition filed challenging the Notification—Possession of land had already been taken by the authorities—Whether notification is liable to be quashed—(No)—No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned notification—Instead of quashing the impugned notification, Court shifts the date of notification to the date when possession of land was taken by respondents from the writ petitioners—Land owners to be adequately compensated.

       Held : Having held that the impugned notification regarding acquisition of land is invalid because it fails to meet the statutory requirements and also having found that taking possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the present case in pursuance of the said notification was not in accordance with law, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners. The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the present case was for a project of great national importance, i.e. the construction of a national highway. The construction of national highway on the acquired land has already been completed as informed to us during the course of hearing. No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the land owners may be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the land owners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the land owners, that is, writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action. (Para 14)

       Normally, compensation is determined as per the market price of land on the date of issuance of the notification regarding acquisition of land. There are precedents by way of judgments of this Court where in similar situations instead of quashing the impugned notification, this Court shifted the date of the notification so that the land owners are adequately compensated. (Para 15)

       In that direction the next step is what should be the crucial date in the facts of the present case for determining the quantum of compensation. We feel that the relevant date in the present case ought to be the date when possession of the land was taken by the respondents from the writ petitioners. This date admittedly is 19th February, 2003. We, therefore, direct that compensation payable to the writ petitioners be determined as on 19th February, 2003, the date on which they were deprived of possession of their lands. We do not quash the impugned notification in order not to disturb what has already taken place by way of use of the acquired land for construction of the national highway. (Para 15)