2005(8) Supreme 49
Supreme Court of India
(From Karnataka High Court)
R.C. Lahoti, CJI., G.P. Mathur and P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.
State of Karnataka —Appellant
versus
Laxuman —Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 2024 of 1999
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 4459/1999, 607-609/2000, 5547/2000, 1566/2001 and 1567/2001
Decided on 25-10-2005
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant : Sanjay R. Hegde, Anil K. Mishra, A. Rohen Singh, Advocates, N. Ganpathy, Advocate (NP).
For the Respondent No. 1566/2001 : K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Advocate and Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, Advocate.
Held : On a plain understanding of the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as amended in Karnataka, it is apparent that a claimant has to make an application for reference within a period of 90 days of the service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. The section casts a duty on the concerned officer to make a reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application for reference. The mere inaction on the part of the officer does not affect or straightaway extinguish, the right of the claimant-applicant. The claimant is conferred the right to approach the court but he has to do so, within three years of his having made an application for reference in view of the general law of limitation. It is in this context that it has been held that the time available to a claimant for approaching the court for getting a reference made, is in all, three years and 90 days from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. That accrual is when he makes an application for reference within the time prescribed by Section 18(2) of the Act. The controversy that is generated in these appeals is whether on the expiry of the said period of three years and 90 days, the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of the claimant to move the court, get extinguished. It is to be remembered that the claimant had made his application for reference within the 90 days prescribed by the statute. Should a construction be adopted which will lead to a position that a claimant who has done his part, loses his right on the failure of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application for reference? That will depend on the statutory scheme. If we construe the provision as conferring on the litigant a further right to approach the court for getting the matter referred, in case a Deputy Commissioner fails to make a reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application, we have prima facie to say that on his failure to approach the court and get the reference made, he would lose his right to have a reference for enhancement of compensation. Obviously, the mischief that was sought to be averted by the Legislature was the causing of undue delay by Deputy Commissioners in making references and the making of highly belated references, sometimes based on applications clandestinely received long after the award itself had been made. If we keep this object in view, the conclusion possible is that, if a claimant does not get his claim referred to the court within three years of his making the application before the Deputy Commissioner within the period fixed and the accrual of a cause of action, his right to claim enhancement of compensation would get extinguished. In the context of Section 28A of the Act, there will be no irreparable prejudice caused to the claimant since he can always make a claim for more based on any enhancement of award by a court in any other reference arising out of the acquisition under the same notification. The difference may be only in the matter of interest and the like. (Para 5)
Whatever might have been the controversy in the High Court in that regard, after the decision of this Court in The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore vs. Thakoredas, Major and others (supra), the time for approaching the court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act stands crystalised. The application has to be made within three years of the expiry of 90 days from the date of application under Section 18(1) of the Act made by the claimant. If the application is not made within that time the right to move is lost. In that case, the court dismissed the application under Section 18(3) (b) of the Act. We have, therefore, to proceed on the basis that the remedy of approaching the court under Section 18(3) (b) of the Act gets extinguished on the expiry of the period limited therefor. This Court has also held that in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act before the authorities under that Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application (See Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and another vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal and others (1996 (9) SCC 414). Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be resorted to while making an application under Section 18(1) of the Act and the application has to be made within the period fixed by Section 18(2) of the Act. (Paras 8 and 9)
The High Court, in our view, erred in proceeding on an enquiry as to whether the obligation under Section 18(3)(a) of the Act on the Deputy Commissioner was mandatory or directory. In fact, if one were to go by the use of the expression “shall”, and the introduction of Section 18(3)(b) and the right conferred thereunder, there is no difficulty even in taking the view that it is mandatory for the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within 90 days of receipt of the application for reference. When he fails to perform the mandate of the statute, the provision gives the claimant a right to approach the Court which could compel the reference to be made by the Deputy Commissioner who had failed to perform his duty under Section 18(3)(a) of the Act and in that process, even award costs of the proceedings against the Deputy Commissioner, and in appropriate cases, to be recovered from him personally. But what is relevant is not the question whether the duty cast on the Deputy Commissioner under Section 18(3)(a) of the Act as in Karnataka is mandatory or it is directory. On its scheme, the Deputy Commissioner is expected to make the reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application. On his failure to do so, the claimant has to approach the Land Acquisition Court for getting the matter referred. (Para 13)
Then the question is, whether in the context of Section 18 of the Karnataka amendment, the decision of this Court in Thakoredas (supra) and our discussion as above, Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked or would apply to an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. This Court has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to proceedings before the Collector or Deputy Commissioner here, while entertaining an application for reference. We see no reason not to accept that position. Then arises the question whether Section 5 could be invoked before the Land Acquisition Court while making an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. We have held in agreement with the earlier Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, that the right to have a reference enforced through court or through the Deputy Commissioner becomes extinguished on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference made in time. Consistent with this position it has necessarily to be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be available since the consequence of not enforcing the right to have a reference made on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as obtaining in Karnataka, is to put an end to the right to have a reference at all. Since in that since it is an extinguishment of the right, the right cannot be revived by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. (Para 21)
Judgment
P.K. Balasubramanyan, J.—All these appeals involve questions connected with the scope and effect of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka. The brief facts leading to the appeals are as under.
Civil Appeal No. 2024 of 1999
The State challenges the order of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 3682 of 1995 by which the learned Judge dismissed the revision filed by the State challenging the order of the Civil Judge, being the land acquisition court, purporting to condone the delay in filing an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended in Karnataka. The notice of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act was served on the claimant on 6.1.1984. Under Section 18(2) of the Act, the claimant had 90 days from the date of service of that notice, to seek a reference under that Section for enhancement of compensation. The respondent claimed that an application under Section 18(1) of the Act seeking a reference was filed on 15.3.1984, within 90 days of 6.1.1984, but the reference was not made by the Deputy Commissioner within 90 days thereafter as enjoined by Section 18(3)(a) of the Act. The claimant approached the civil court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act only in April 1994, more than 10 years after the receipt of the notice of the award. The claimant also purported to file an application for condoning the delay in making the application. This was in view of the fact that it had been held that an application to the court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act had to be made within three years of the expiry of 90 days of the date of making an application seeking a reference for enhancement of compensation. The State opposed the application for condoning the delay on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had no application and that, in any event, no ground was made out for condoning the long delay of ten years in filing the application. The civil judge proceeded to condone the delay and proceeded to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act. In revision, the High Court refused to interfere on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had application and there was no reason to interfere with the condoning of the delay by the civil judge. The High Court apparently without even a verification, merely accepted the evidence of PW 1 that he had made an application within 90 days of the receipt of the notice of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved by that order, this appeal by special leave has been filed by the State.
Civil Appeal No. 4459 of 1999
In this case, the civil judge dismissed the application made under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act by the respondent on the ground that the application was barred by limitation. This order of the civil judge was challenged in an appeal before the District Judge. It is not clear under what provision such an appeal was filed, since under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended in Karnataka no appeal is provided to the District Court from such an order of the civil judge and an appeal is provided only against the award. The appellate court is seen to have held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable and the learned civil judge was in error in dismissing the application for compelling the reference under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act without deciding the prayer for condonation of the delay in filing that application. This order of the District Judge was challenged in revision before the High Court. The High Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had application and declined to interfere with the order of remand made by the Additional District Judge. The High Court, thus, dismissed the revision filed by the State. Aggrieved by this order, the State has come up with this appeal by special leave.
Civil Appeal Nos. 607-609 of 2000
In the first case it appears that the applicatio
The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition, Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas, Major and Ors.
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