Judgment

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. :- The Army Medical Corps Civilian Employees Union, Lucknow was registered on January 27, 1964 with the Registrar of Trade Unions, Uttar Pradesh, under the provisions of the Trade. Unions Act. The members of the Union are carpenters, tailors, boot-makers, gardeners, sweepers, cooks, messengers, etc., who may be compendiously described as Camp-followers of the Army. The registration of the Trade Union was cancelled on January 6, 1978 by the Registrar of Trade Unions on the ground that such registration had ceased to be valid in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1821 of 1974. It was said that the registration was initially granted under a mistake and it was, therefore, cancelled. This order of cancellation of registration of the Union is challenged in these petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution.

2. The submission of Sri Anil Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners is that the members of the Union who are civilian employees of the Army Medical Corps are not subject to the Army Act and the rules made thereunder and Art. 33 of the Constitution has no application to them. It is not disputed that if the members of the Union are subject to the Army Act and the rules made thereunder, the Union cannot be validly registered. Sri Gupta submits that unless the members of the Union are brought within the compass of S. 2(l)(i), Army Act, it is not possible to hold them subject to the Army Act. Section 2(l)(i) refers to "Persons not otherwise subject to military law who, on active service, in camp, on the march or at any frontier post specified by the Central Government by notification in this behalf are employed by, or are in the service of, or are followers of, or accompany any portion of, the regular Army." The question, therefore, is whether these Camp-followers fall within S. 2(l)(i) and are subject to the Army Act and the rules made thereunder. Sri Gupta argues that they are not, unless they are on active service, in camp, on the march or any frontier post specified by Central Government in this behalf. On the other hand the learned Additional Solicitor General urges that in order to fall within S. 2(l)(i), it is not necessary that the Camp-followers should themselves be on active service, in camp, on the march or at any frontier post but that it is enough if they can be required to follow or accompany armed personnel who are on active service, in camp, on the march or at any frontier post. It is unnecessary for us to consider the merits of the submissions since the question is no longer res integra. It is concluded by the decision of a (near) Constitution bench consisting of A.N. Ray, C.J., Beg, Sarkaria, Shinghal, JJ. in Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCR 769 : (AIR 1976 SC 1179). The question in that case pertained to the formation of Unions of "noncombatants Un-enrolled" consisting of cooks, chokidars, larkers, barbers, carpenters, mechanics, boot-makers, tailors, etc. Dealing with the contention that they were not subject to Army Act and, therefore, their freedom of association guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(c) of the Constitution could (not) be curtailed, the Court said,

"Article 33 of the Constitution provides an exception to the preceding Articles in Part III including Art. 10(l)(c). By Article 33, Parliament is empowered to enact law determining to what extent any of the rights conferred by Part III shall, in their application, to the members of the Armed Forces or Forces charged with the maintenance of public order, be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them.

In enacting the Army Act, 1950, in so far as it restricts or abrogates any of the fundamental rights of the members of the Armed Forces, Parliament derives its competence from Art. 33 of the Constitution. Section 2(l) of the Act enumerates the persons who are subject to the operation of this Act. According