SUPREME COURT OF INDIA SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.
Civil Appeal No. 3378 of 1983, D/- 18-11-1986.
Amarjit Singh, Appellant
Versus
Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, Respondent.
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 14(l)(e), 14 - Andhra Pradesh Buildings Control Act, 1960 – Section 10(3)(iii) - Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 – Section 12(1)(h) – Constitution Of India, 1950 - Article 21, 300A, 14 - Rent Restriction Acts - Landlady - Tenant - Claim For Eviction - Landlady, according to her, needed one floor to let out one of floors of that building to have income to support herself which, according to her, was her only source of livelihood and ground floor of premises at time of filing of petition was in occupation of New Zealand Embassy at Rs. 2,500/- per month as rent - If was her case that she wanted to keep ground floor let out to a tenant to draw a decent amount of rent and only premises left for her residence was therefore premises disputed flat - Whether huge bank balances alleged to belong to landlady yield any income or not or is insufficient income for her to live - Whether it fell vacant once, twice or thrice but it indisputably fell vacant during proceedings and she chose not to occupy same - Whether it can be said that landlady had reasonably suitable other accommodation – Held, Court must proceed on assumption that landlady needed money to live and income from her house letting was a source of her income - Rent restriction laws are both beneficial and restrictive, beneficial for those who want protection from eviction and rack-renting but restrictive so far as landlords right or claim for eviction is concerned - Rent restriction laws would provide a habitat for landlord or landlady if need be, but not to seek comforts other than habitat that right landlord must seek elsewhere - If landlady or landlord could have reasonable accommodation after his or her need arose and she by her own conduct disentitled herself to that property by letting it out for higher income, she would be disentitled to evict her tenant on ground of her need - Philosophy and principle of rent restriction law have nothing to do with private exploitation of property by owners of property in derogation of tenants need of protection from eviction in a society of shortage of accommodation - In premises Court is of opinion that High Court was wrong in view and approach it took and in view of undisputed facts that landlady had in her choice to go into premises in question but she did not, she has become disentitled to right of eviction - Fact that tenant was a troublesome tenant inasmuch as he questioned liability to landlord is irrelevant – Appeal Allowed.
Judgment
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.:- This appeal by special leave arises out of the order of the High Court of Delhi dated 21st March, 1983.
On or about 3rd January, 1977, the landlady, the respondent herein, had filed a petition for eviction of the appellant, the tenant, from the first floor of the premises situated at C-62, Maharani Bagh, New Delhi along with a garage on the ground floor with a servants quarter above the garage as per the plan annexed with the petition (hereinafter referred to as the disputed flat). The ground of eviction was the bona fide personal necessity of the landlady. The premises had been let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 950/- and Rs. 50/- per month as facility for booster pump - totalling to Rs. 1,000/- per month, exclusive of water and electricity charges.
3. The respondent claimed to be the owner of the premises and stated that she required the premises for her residence and for the residence of the members of her family and further she was not in possession of any other suitable residential accommodation. She was at the time of filing of the petition, living, according to her, as a guest of her niece in her house in D-36, Nizammuddin East, New Delhi. She had asserted that she could not continue residing there permanently or indefinitely and that the accommodation with her niece was limited being only two bed rooms with a common bath room and that her niece wanted her own mother to stay with her and would like the landlady to shift as soon as respondent could. It was further averred that the niece of the respondent landlady was a working woman and for meeting her clients she needed accommodation as she was at all relevant time working as an executive in an advertising agency. It was also stated that the landlady was a social worker and had her own sphere of activities. There were two flats in the building in question. The landlady, according to her, needed one floor to let out one of the floors of that building to have income to support herself which, according to her, was her only source of livelihood and the ground floor of the premises at the time of the filing of the petition was in occupation of New Zealand Embassy at Rs. 2,500/- per month as rent. If was her case that she wanted to keep the ground floor let out to a tenant to draw a decent amount of rent and the only premises left for her residence was therefore the premises the disputed flat.
4. The learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the order under appeal has stated that on 14th March, 1974, the landlady has earlier also filed an eviction application against M/s Jaaj Timber Products (P) Ltd. on the ground that the said company was her tenant of the first floor of the suit premises and it was required for her residence. In the earlier petition, a written statement was filed by the tenant/appellant who was the Managing Director of that company. The landlady had also on 17th April, 1976 filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 35,000/- as arrears of rent for the period 1st May, 1973 to 31st March, 1976. But in both the earlier eviction petition and the suit for the recovery of rent, the aforesaid company took up the position that the company was not a tenant but the appellant alone was the tenant and this contention of the appellant was upheld by judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi dated 1st November, 1976 and it was found that the appellant alone was a tenant in his individual capacity. This fact was relevant only from one point of view, namely, the argument that the appellant was a troublesome tenant. This is noted for this purpose because a contention was advanced by Shri Kacker, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent herein, in support of his contention that in judging the bona fide and reasonableness of the requirement of the landlord, the conduct of the tenant is a relevant factor to be borne in mind. To continue with a narration of events, however, it has to be noted that the earlier eviction petition was d
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