Judgement

OZA, J.:- This appeal on leave has been filed against the judgment of the Gauhati High Court delivered in Civil Revn. No. 96 of 1973 decided on March 7, 1974 (reported in 1975 Lab. IC 1539). The short question that arises in this appeal is in respect of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit that was filed against the respondent defendant. The appellant plaintiff was an employed-of M/s. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. Calcutta. The Manager of the Company who was defendant No. 2, on 16-10-1971 served a notice on the appellant plaintiff asking him to explain certain charges of misconduct. In the course of domestic enquiry held by the management, the appellant plaintiff was ultimately dismissed from service on 28th November, 1971. According to the appellant plaintiff the order of dismissal is contrary to the provisions of the Standing Orders framed under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and on this ground he sought the relief of declaration that the dismissal is null and void and inoperative as he was not guilty of any misconduct as no enquiry was conducted, the dismissal was bad in accordance with the Standing Orders. He also sought the relief of back wages and injunction not to give effect to the order of dismissal. This suit was filed by the appellant plaintiff before the Court of Munsif. The defendant respondent in their written statement raised the plea that the suit is not maintainable as the relief which is sought is available to the appellant plaintiff under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was also pleaded that the suit is not maintainable under Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial Court on the basis of these pleadings framed two preliminary issues which were :

(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form?

(ii) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit?

The trial Court came to the conclusion that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try the suit and the suit is not barred because of Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act. Against this order of the trial Court a revision petition was taken to the High Court and by the impugned judgment the High Court held that the nature of relief which was sought by the appellant plaintiff was such which could only be granted under the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of language of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure contended that the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to try all kind of suits except those which are either expressly or impliedly barred and on this basis it was contended that there is no express bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the High Court was not right in reaching the conclusion that it was impliedly barred whereas learned counsel for the respondent contended that the relief which was sought by the appellant plaintiff in substance was the relief of reinstatement with backwages which relief is not the right of the appellant plaintiff under the contract or under the civil law. This right is only conferred on him because of the Industrial Disputes Act and the relief is available only in the Industrial Disputes Act. The Act itself provides the procedure and remedy and it is not open to the appellant to approach the Civil Court for getting the relief which he could only get under the scheme of the procedure of conciliation, reference to the labour Court and ultimately decision of the labour Court. It was in the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act itself that the enforcement of the Standing Orders could be made and an order which is not in accordance with the Standing Orders could be set aside and the relief as was claimed by the appellant plaintiff could be granted. It is in this view that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred. Learned counsel