(1) SPECIAL leave granted.

(2) SINCE common questions of law and facts arise for decision in the cases, they are disposed of together. Ekatali village in Jharsuguda District in orissa State was part of the erstwhile Sambalpur District. To lay the road from Jharsuguda to Belpahar a notification was published on 25/9/1962 under Section 4(1 of the Land Acquisition Act excluding 4.19 acres in Plot No. 121, Khata No. 93 of the said village as that the land belongs to the government. When the road was being laid. Respondent I, hereinafter the respondent, had objected to and represented on 7/4/1982 to the government that he is a tenant in that land having a patta from Gokulanand Lambardar Gountia on 12/10/1944 and ever since he had been in its possession and enjoyment. The Additional District Magistrate in his letter dated 6/10/1982 sent his report and the Board of Revenue issued a notice to the respondent in O.E.A. Revision Case No. 37 of 1989 to show cause for cancellation of patta granted to him by the Tehsildar. After considering his objections and giving an opportunity of hearing, by order dated 2/12/1992, set aside the patta granted to the respondent as a tenant by Gokulanand Gountia and recognised by the Tehsildar under Section 8(1 of the orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951, Act 1/52, for short the Act. In O.J.C. No. 781/1993, the division bench of orissa High court by order dated 10/5/1993 quashed the order of Board of Revenue finding that the revisional power under Section 38-B of the Act was illegally exercised after a lapse of 27 years. The appeal out of Special Leave Petition No. 15486/1993 thus arises. Preceding thereto despite the respondents objections, when the road was being laid across his lands, the respondent filed O.J.C. No. 2761/1992 and the division bench by its order dated 20/10/1992 held that the respondent was in possession of the lands as a tenant under the ex-intermediary, the Lambardar Gountia, as recognised by the Tehsildar and, therefore, his right to the lands cannot be interfered with in any manner by the State without acquiring the land by due process of law. Since the road had already been laid, no direction was issued to the appellants to restitute the lands to the respondent; but the bench directed the Revenue Department to pay him compensation according to law. When the pendency of revision under Section 38-B was brought to the notice of the High court, it opined that the exercise of revisional power was debatable. Thus the other appeal.

(3) SRI Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State contended that Gokulanand Gountia (sic Patel) was never a Lambardar Gountia. The patta said to have been granted by him to the respondent on a plain paper was obviously fabricated one only some time after the Act had come into force with antedate of 1946. The Tehsildar has no jurisdiction to recognise the respondent as a tenant under Section 8(1 of the Act unless he obtains prior confirmation from the Board of Revenue. After this fact was brought to the notice of the authorities in the representation of the respondent dated 24-12-1982, immediate action was initiated and no delay, much less appreciable delay, had occurred to correct the order under Section 38-B of the Act. Even otherwise, the order of the Tehsildar being without jurisdiction is void and non est. The delay does not stand in the way and the invalidity of the patta propounded by the respondent could be set up in any proceedings at any stage. Therefore, the interference by the High court on the ground that power under Section 38-B was exercised after lapse of 27 years was not warranted is clearly erroneous. The entitlement for compensation by the respondent, on the basis of void patta, is untenable. The government, therefore, is not obliged to acquire its own land nor liable to pay compensation to the person in wrongful possession of government land without any right, title and interest in the land.