ORDER

1. The short question that arises in these cases is whether a contractual tenant alone can assign or transfer his interest in the demised property and such a right of assignment or transfer is not available to the statutory tenant ? In Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi it was held that after termination of the contractual tenancy the right to remain in possession is personal and is, therefore, not capable of transfer or assignment, Again, in Jaisingh Morarji v. Sovani (P) Ltd. this proposition was reiterated. This Court in Jagdish Chander Chatterji v. Shri Kishan while dealing with the Rajasthan Act took the view that such an interest is not heritable. Then came Damadilal v. Parashram in which this Court took the view that the right is heritable. This view was followed in Ganapati Sitaram Balvalkar v. Waman Shripad Mage and Sardar Tota Singh v. Gold Field Leather Works.

2. Then comes the most important case of Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar. In paras 26, 31 and 35 in no uncertain terms the five-Judge Bench stated as under : (SCC pp. 704-712)

"The other section of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 considered by this Court in deciding Damadilal case was Section 14 which deals with sub-letting and this Court held that there was nothing in that section to suggest that the section would not apply to all tenants as defined in Section 2(l) of the said Act. Section 14 was considered in Damadilal case to ascertain whether the so-called statutory tenant enjoyed the same right as the contractual tenant in the matter of sub-letting and this Court held that the so-called statutory tenant enjoyed the same right as the contractual tenant.

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We now proceed to deal with the further argument advanced on behalf of the landlords that the amendment to the definition of tenant with retrospective effect introduced by the Delhi Rent Control Amendment Act (Act 18 of 1976) to give personal protection and personal right of continuing in possession to the heirs of the deceased statutory tenant in respect of residential premises only and not with regard to the heirs of the so-called statutory tenant in respect of commercial premises, indicates that the heirs of so-called statutory tenants, therefore, do not enjoy any protection under the Act. This argument proceeds on the basis that in the absence of any specific right created in favour of the so-called statutory tenant in respect of his tenancy, the heirs of the statutory tenant who do not acquire any interest or estate in the tenanted premises, become liable to be evicted as a matter of course. The very premise on the basis of which the argument is advanced, is, in our opinion, unsound. The termination of the contractual tenancy in view of the definition of tenant in the Act does not bring about any change in the status and legal position of the tenant, unless there are contrary provisions in the Act; and, the tenant notwithstanding the termination of tenancy does enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises. This interest or estate which the tenant under the Act despite termination of the contractual tenancy continues to enjoy creates a heritable interest in the absence of any provision to the contrary. We have earlier noticed the decision of this Court in Damadilal case. This view has been taken by this Court in Damadilal case and in our opinion this decision represents the correct position in law. The observations of this Court in the decision of the seven-Judge Bench in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal which we have earlier quoted appear to conclude the question. The amendment of the definition of tenant by the Act 18 of 1976 introducing particularly Section 2(1) (iii) does not in any way mitigate against this view. The said sub-clause (iii) with all the three Explanations thereto is not in any way inconsistent with or contrary to sub-clause (ii) of section 2(f) which unequivocally states that ten