JUDGMENT

D.P.MOHAPATRA, J.

(1) LEAVE granted.

(2) THE appellant herein is the wife of the respondent. She has challenged the order dated 2.8.2000 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in miscellaneous criminal case no. 2472 of 1999. In the said order, the High Court in exercise of power under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short Cr.P.C.) quashed the order passed by the learned judicial magistrate first class, Jabalpur under section 125 Cr.P.C. granting Rs. 250/- per month as maintenance for the wife which was confirmed by the learned 4th upper additional sessions judge, Jabalpur. From the discussions in the impugned order, it appears that the High Court interfered with the concurrent orders of the courts below mainly on two grounds; that the wife has left the matrimonial home voluntarily; and that she admitted that she was earning Rs. 50/- per day by agricultural operation. The High Court also observed that in her statement she accepted the position that her father-in-law owned no agricultural land and that her husband, who was wandering aimlessly, had no source of income.

(3) BEFORE taking up the merits of the case, it would be proper to consider the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482 Cr. P.C. by the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a case where the sessions court exercising revisional power under section 397(3) Cr.P.C. has dismissed the revision petition by the aggrieved party, a second revision petition about acceptance of the same party is barred. The position is well-settled that in such a case power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court in rare cases and in exceptional circumstances where the court finds that permitting the impugned order to remain undisturbed will amount to abuse of process of the court and will result in failure of justice. The Court in the case of Dharampal & Ors. v. Ramshri (Smt.) & Ors., [JT 1993 (1) SC 61], held:

".....SECTION 397(3) bars a second revision application by the same party. It is now well- settled that the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Hence, the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of respondent 1. On this short ground itself, the impugned order of the High Court can be set aside."

(4) IN the case of Deepti alias Arati Rai v. Akhil Rai & Ors., [(1995) 5 SCC 751], a similar view was taken by this Court and it was observed:

"...IT should have also applied its mind to the aspect that second revision application, after dismissal of the first one by sessions court is not maintainable and that inherent power under section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code..."

(5) IN the case of Krishnan & Anr. v. Krishnaveni & Anr., [JT 1997 (1) SC 657], a three judge bench of this Court held that the inherent power of the High Court is not one conferred by the Code but one which the High Court already has in it and which is preserved by the Code and that the object of section 397(3) is to put a bar on simultaneous revisional applications to the High Court and the court of sessions so as to prevent unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. This Court made the following observations in paragraph 10 of the judgment:

"ORDINARILY, when revision has been barred by section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under section 397 (1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of section 397(3) or section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the reco